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
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**SIR WALTER SCOTT'S**

## HISTORY

113

# NAPOLEON.

LOUIS BONAPARTE.

POLYSTYRENE-*b*-BLENDED POLYISOPRENE COPOLYMERS

PROTEIN IN THE FEEDS

*Don't wait until it's too late.*

Voy a contaros, amigos, un cuento que me ha pasado.

A translation from the French

PHILADELPHIA:

DADDY, DEAR DADDY.—TUESDAY STAGE.

1990, 1994-1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 267

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1640.



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A REPLY  
TO  
SIR WALTER SCOTT'S  
HISTORY  
OF  
NAPOLEON,

BY  
LOUIS BONAPARTE, *King of Holland.*  
COUNT DE SAINT LEU, EX-KING OF HOLLAND,  
BROTHER OF THE EMPEROR.

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*Doe wel en zie niet om.*  
Fay ce que doy, advienne que pourra.

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A Translation from the French.

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PHILADELPHIA:  
CAREY, LEA & CAREY, —CHESNUT STREET.  
SOLD, IN NEW YORK, BY G. & C. CARVILLE, —IN BOSTON, BY MUNROE  
& FRANCIS.

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1829.



## PREFACE.

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THE literary character of Sir Walter Scott is so highly and so justly prized by his countrymen, that the British public can but be anxious to hear the charges which the brother of Napoleon brings against his history of that extraordinary man. It is rather from the certainty of this very natural curiosity than from any conviction of the merits of the Reply, that the translator has been induced to begin or to continue his labour. That which concerns Sir Walter the most, is the general imputation of calumnious intention which this sensitive commentator brings against him. There can, however, be as little doubt that the impartial reader of the life of Napoleon Bonaparte will acquit his biographer, as that he will make due allowance for the excited feelings of so near a relative writing under the accumulation of painful circumstances which have oc-

curred to render more acute his sense of any injustice, real or suppositious, done to the memory of a brother. Nor will his special accusations produce much more effect, although they can but be taken to demonstrate an amiable regard to the name and fame of one to whose real character and intentions posterity alone can do even that imperfect justice which it belongs to history to afford.

The best defence of Sir Walter Scott's book, should it be thought to require any, appears to lie in the fact—that it was the author's intention to produce merely a popular history. Thus, they who anticipated a dramatic and romantic tale, and they who expected a profound and philosophical Work, are alike disappointed. But the public—namely, that vast proportion of the country which was eager to be made acquainted with the great and prominent features of the transactions of France from the rise to the conclusion of the revolution—particularly with the actions of Bonaparte—and to obtain as much knowledge of his personal conduct and bearing as must necessarily be gathered from such a life, has been, there is every reason to believe, at once amused and satisfied. The internal evidence is amply sufficient to convince the inquirer that the entire scope of Sir Walter Scott's purpose must have been general truth rather than that ela-

borate investigation which settles the curious and minute particulars of history. The translator thinks it due to himself to prefix these opinions, to obviate any the most remote supposition that he makes himself a party to the vituperation with which the author of the original has loaded Sir Walter—at the same time perhaps it should seem proper to avow, that he has not the honour of the slightest personal acquaintance or communication with that gentleman.

In order to make the authenticity of the Reply more certain and authoritative, the Conte de St. Leu has affixed a list of his works and his signature to the book. They are as follow:—

Marie ou les Hollandaises, Roman en 3 petits vols. 12mo.

Documens historiques sur la Hollande, 3 vols. 8vo.

Mémoire sur la versification, contenant un recueil d'odes publiées précédemment en brochure et des essais de vers sans rime.

Essai sur la versification, 2 vols. in 8vo. contenant l'opera de Ruth, la tragédie Lucrèce; ces deux pièces écrites en vers sans rime, et la comédie de l'Avere de Molière, réduite en vers de la même espèce.

Nouveau recueil de poesies publiées a Florence l'année dernière, et contenant la suite de Lutrin, poeme en 5 chants, &c.

Cette réponse à Sir Walter Scott.



A REPLY  
TO  
**SIR WALTER SCOTT'S**  
HISTORY OF  
**NAPOLEON,**  
BY  
LOUIS BONAPARTE,  
COUNT DE SAINT LEU, EX-KING OF HOLLAND,  
BROTHER OF THE EMPEROR.

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HISTORY is in itself so uncertain and so easily falsified and disfigured, that I do not like historical romances; I, however, wish to do justice to the author of so many brilliant pictures of manners and characters. When the work which forms the object of these observations was announced, I imagined that so distinguished a writer, tired of the vain renown of the novelist, wished to raise himself to that of the legitimate historian; but to my great astonishment, I found on reading this book, that after having turned into romance some parts of the history of his own country, he has now converted into history the romances and libels, fabricated during the last thirty years, against France and against Napoleon.

Nevertheless we distinguish in this work two different, and, as it were, two opposite styles; one of which, conforming to truth, is almost always the eulogium of Napoleon; and the other, a false or exaggerated criticism, is too often ironical, calumnious, and cruel. One would say that the first only is the conscientious work of the author.

The best reply would be to establish with precision facts so much disfigured by enmity; but this is not now my object; I wish but to protest against the exaggeration, the injustice, the falsehood, the calumny, and I will even say the excessive calumny, spread throughout the work of Sir Walter Scott; and I have the greater right to do this, because concerning a great number of facts I can add my ocular testimony, since I lived with my brother from eleven years of age, and almost always accompanied him until that of twenty-seven, when I went to Holland.

The evident object of the author is not only to lower the glory of Napoleon, but also to slander the whole nation, and principally his immortal and ever triumphant armies, suppressed rather than vanquished in 1814 by treason.

Genius and glory have not been, are not, and never will be, the property of a single nation, of a single army, of a single chief; every country possesses and has possessed its share; but it does not raise the great men of one country above those of any

other to heap malice and calumny upon either. Far from so doing, the great care which is taken to blacken and disfigure them, and to exaggerate their defects, their errors, and their faults, from which they cannot be exempt since they are but men, proves on the contrary how much their celebrity wounds common-place rivalry and enmity; but great actions have this advantage over fine writing, even over the most adroit calumnies, that the latter disappear under the scythe of time, whilst the former are not only untouched by it, but their very celebrity augments and is consolidated as it grows older.

## VOLUME III.

I COULD not conceal from myself the bad intentions of the author, on perceiving that in a work, the object of which is to make known the life of Napoleon, he does not begin to speak of him until the third volume. It is evident that he has wished to attach the name of Napoleon to the excesses and horrors of the revolution, to which he was not only a stranger, but to which he put an end. He has also wished to augment and exaggerate those excesses and horrors from a sentiment of enmity against France, as unjust as it is *ungenerous*.

Another visible object is, that of desiring to make Napoleon pass as a foreigner in France.

In fact, if such were not the intentions of the author, why this obstinacy in writing the family name of Napoleon, *Buonaparte*, instead of *Bonaparte*, consecrated as it is by long habit?

Certainly the letter O is not more or less noble or French than the letter U, but it is done to impress a *foreign* character upon Napoleon, and divide his glory from that of France.

The Italian nation is sufficiently glorious for one to be proud of belonging to it, especially of deriving one's origin from this beautiful country; but when one has been born under the laws of France, grown up on its soil, with no other knowledge of foreign countries, even of beautiful Italy, than that gained with the victorious legions of France, it is rather too ridiculous to receive from an English author the certificate of a foreigner.

One observation could not escape me on this subject; which is, that allowing Napoleon to have the right to spell his name as he pleased, the author writes it as it is not the custom of our family.

A similar wicked intention will be found in the article on the siege of Toulon; where, to diminish the glory of this first exploit of Napoleon, the author makes him participate in the horrors that followed the capture—a circumstance which during 30 years no libeller had ever imagined. This is the more remarkable, as he himself says, at the conclusion of this calumny, that it is without foundation. Why then does he consign it a place in his book? Can it be with any other intention than to blacken the renown of him, of whom he calls himself the historian? Our author doubtless is not responsible for the few merits of his book—no one can give more than he has; it shows however but little respect to the public, it is to be wanting in self-respect not to give himself the trouble of verifying the assertions he advances. But these sort of works

are commercial speculations upon the greedy curiosity of readers, which are productive in proportion to the malice and calumny they contain, and doubtless the life of Napoleon, by Sir Walter Scott, is of this number—else what can we conceive !!

We find at page 6, vol. III. that Lucien was scarcely inferior to his brother in talent and ambition. As to ambition, the author himself contradicts this observation, when he declares that Lucien refused the honours Napoleon offered him, on condition that his second marriage should not be acknowledged. And as to talents, I feel assured that Lucien himself, notwithstanding the eloquence and ability which distinguish him, never dreamed of entering into rivalry with his brother. But after having endeavoured to give the title of foreigner to the man whom the French chose for their Emperor, after having essayed to lower his great actions, they would even take from him his superiority in his own family. I think myself therefore obliged here to declare—I, brother of the Emperor Napoleon—that it was in his family he began to exercise the greatest superiority, not when glory and power had elevated him, but even from his youth.

The author affects to call the French soldiers of the first years of the revolution Sans-culottes and Carmagnoles, and he thus shows himself both unjust and but little informed of the state of affairs. If he had better studied the composition of the armies at this period he would have known that the

French troops formed of the youth of the nation, put in requisition, were composed of the purest blood of the nation, and that it was not rare to find in their ranks sons and brothers of the victims of revolutionary fury.

*Vol. III. page 14.*—"Though of Italian origin, Buonaparte had not a decided taste for the fine arts," says Sir Walter Scott.

I venture to believe that even in England he will find few persons of his opinion. Is it not playing with the credulity of his readers to advance such an assertion? He who enriches his country by the most brilliant collection of the chef d'œuvres of antiquity; he who during the whole of his reign, encouraged the production of great works and recompensed artists with an unheard of magnificence; he who established decennial prizes, and gave a wider range to national production; he who raised in Paris monuments which Sir Walter Scott could not avoid seeing in his short journey to that capital; he who caused to be constructed the prodigious road which traverses the Alps, he had no taste for the fine arts!!!

Such a discussion may be addressed to posterity; but if it reaches it, it will only be to the shame of the author.

*Vol. III. page 21.*—"Buonaparte was in Corsica, upon leave of absence from his regiment, when these events were taking place; and although he himself and Paoli had hitherto been on friendly terms, and some family relations existed between them," &c.

There did not exist the least relationship between our family and that of Paoli. My father, Charles Bonaparte, was united by friendship to Paoli, whom he aided in the defence of the island. Napoleon could not have known Paoli, since he was born after the departure of the latter for England. It was not the cause of the Convention which Napoleon embraced, but the cause of France, that of his country against the enemy. The Corsican factions of which Walter Scott speaks were nothing more than insurrections raised by the English and by Paoli, who having received from the Government the command of this military division of France, made use of his authority to give up the country to England.

After the bad success of the expedition of Sardinia, commanded by admiral Fruguet and old general Casabianca, in which Napoleon had a separate command, Paoli endeavoured in vain to shake the fidelity of the latter, who hastened to join the commissaries of the government, Lacombe Saint Michel and Saliceti; it was with them that he endeavoured to drive the insurgents from Ajaccio; not being able to succeed, he re-entered his regiment, that of Grenoble, which then was with the army of Italy, at head quarters at Nice.

It is equally false that Masseria and not Masserio, one of the companions of Paoli, was a relation of Napoleon; he was quite unknown to us.

*Vol. III, page, 23.*—"Napoleon and his brother Lucien, who had distinguished themselves as partisans of the French, were subjected to a decree of banishment from their native island; and Madame Buonaparte, with her three daughters, and Jerome, who was as yet but a child, set sail under their protection, and settled for a time, first at Nice, and afterwards at Marseilles, &c.

These details are not exact; those I have given in *Documens historiques sur la Hollande* are perfectly correct, and ought to be credited, because although a child, I was with my mother at this period, whom I followed into Provence and lived with her until the taking of Toulon, when I embraced the military profession.

It was not Lucien who accompanied Napoleon, but Joseph: Lucien was then at Marseilles with the ambassador Semonville, whom he was to accompany to Constantinople. Jerome, scarcely seven years old, and Caroline, aged eight, resided at Ajaccio, and were not brought to us until some time after, whilst I was with my mother and my uncle arch-deacon Fesch, since Cardinal.

I relate these little inaccuracies merely to establish facts as they really occurred.

*Vol. III. page 23.*—"Napoleon never again revisited Corsica," &c.

This is false, as he disembarked at Ajaccio on his return from Egypt, and remained there several days before his arrival at Frejus. However puerile these observations may seem, they nevertheless

prove the little respect the author has paid to truth in compiling his work.

It is said (page 30) that Napoleon was protected by his countryman, the deputy of the Convention Saliceti, who had voted the death of the king; instead of which it was this deputy who, with his colleagues, Albite and Ricord, caused Napoleon to be arrested at head quarters at Nice, and made him submit to an arrest of several days, during which time they inspected all his papers, which they did not restore until after they had ransacked them.

The author is so careless in informing himself of the truth, that he says, after the taking of Toulon, Napoleon was confirmed in his provisional rank of a chief of battalion, and employed by this title in the army of Italy, whilst in fact he was chief of battalion, or lieutenant-colonel in the fourth regiment of artillery, that of Grenoble, on arriving at the siege of Toulon, and after the capture he was promoted to the rank of general of brigade of artillery, commandant in chief of that of the army of Italy. It was in this capacity that he inspected and fortified the coasts, and not in consequence of a commission received from the Convention.

*Vol. III. page 49.*—"In May, 1795, he came to Paris to solicit employment in his profession. He found himself unfriended and indigent in the city of which he was at no distant period to be the ruler. Some individuals, however, assisted him, and among others the celebrated performer Talma, who had known him while at the military school," &c.

All this passage is false. Napoleon did not go to Paris to solicit employment, but to join the army of the West, into which he had been removed as commandant of artillery, a destination which displeased him greatly, and which he hoped to change: but it is true he found the deputy Aubry, secretary of military affairs, not very favourably disposed towards him, on account of his extreme youth, and of the severity of the artillery regulations concerning seniority.

His demands were not only refused, but he was even deprived of the command of the artillery in the army of the West, and made to pass into the line as general of brigade. This appeared to Napoleon as an insult—he refused, and lived at Paris without employment, but he enjoyed his pay of an unemployed general officer; and he had with him three officers, Junot, Marmont, and myself. It is true that Marmont quitted him soon after to join his regiment at the army of the Rhine, but Junot still resided with him: and as for myself, I was sent on account of my extreme youth to the school of artillery at Chalons, and it was he who provided for all the attendant expenses.

Napoleon did not know Talma until this period, as when he was at the military schools it was impossible for a pupil to associate with actors; it belonged to the manners of the time in 1795 not only to admit actors into society, but even to give them entertainments in order as it were to make amends for

their former abasement. It was in the society of that period that Napoleon knew Talma; but it is impossible that the pecuniary assistance spoken of should then have been given, unless indeed it were in a reversed sense.

*Vol. III. page 50.*—"Buonaparte had something of his native country in his disposition—he forgot neither benefits nor injuries," &c.

This is false, no one was less vindictive than Napoleon; he received, caressed, advanced his enemies, and the treasons to which he fell a victim were probably owing to his too great confidence.

The pleasantries that next follow upon the design attributed to Napoleon of going into Turkey are as false as they are ridiculous and in bad taste. If he had not always nourished in his breast an ardent patriotism for France, what finer occasion could he have found than that offered to him by General Paoli after the treason of the latter?

*Vol. III. page 72.*—"The trivial proposal attributed by Walter Scott to Barras, when Napoleon was nominated to the command on the 13th vendémiaire, is an insignificant falsehood, and I can prove it to be such. It is said that Barras, addressing himself to Carnot and to Tallien, said, '*I have the man you want; he is a little Corsican officer, who will not stand upon ceremony.*'"

Now, for several months, Napoleon, not being ac-

tively employed, laboured in the military committee, and was well acquainted with Carnot and Tallien, whom he saw daily; how then could Barras make them the proposal attributed to him?

If fresh proofs of the calumnious and defamatory spirit which has dictated the pretended history of Walter Scott were wanting, they will be found in the passage which concludes the second chapter of the third volume. It is there said that the dowry of the first wife of Napoleon was the command of the army of Italy, an absurdity gathered from several libels of the time. It is also said that he hastened to his family, who were at Marseilles, that he might show himself a favourite of fortune in a town which he had quitted a short time before, almost in the condition of an indigent adventurer. Now, this indigent adventurer, on quitting Marseilles, was covered with glory by the capture of Toulon, and more recently by the campaign, during which Saorgio had been taken and the battle of Cairo won: he showed himself at Marseilles as commander in chief of the artillery of Italy. It is true, he relinquished his situation, but it was to occupy another equivalent to it in the army of the West; and the report, which named this change, had at the article Napoleon the following observation:—"A young officer of the greatest distinction, to whom is due the taking of Toulon."

It cannot be impossible to procure a copy of the

military reports of this period, as so many were printed they cannot have entirely disappeared.

At page 118, vol. III. the author ridicules the proclamations of Napoleon, whilst he at the same time stigmatizes the character of the French soldiers. We must pity, without feeling astonishment at the author of so many romances, for his blindness and want of taste; but whether he addresses himself to French or English readers, I doubt if he can convince them that the eloquence and the warriors who achieved so much, were not in the road to greatness and splendour.

*Vol. III. page 141.*—"The next of these sufferers was the Duke of Modena," &c.

Sir Walter Scott considers as victims the Princes of Italy, with whom the French army were engaged; but so far from this expression being just, Napoleon rendered them a great service by signing treaties with them, since by so doing he secured their political existence, at a time when it was powerfully threatened by the system and the instructions of the government, and also by the excitement which prevailed throughout the different countries of Italy.

The contributions in money and works of art to which these princes were submitted were not sacrifices which ought to have weighed against the loss of their political existence.

There was not one of them who did not receive the treaty concerning himself as a benefit and with real joy.

The author says that the motive which induced Napoleon to receive a portion of the contributions in works of art, *was more easily discovered than justified*, (vol. III. page 145,) but he will allow me in my turn to think that the one is as easy as the other.

In fact works of art are trophies of victory: the ancients dragged their captives, and even crowned captives, behind their chariots; the barbarians took or destroyed all conquered countries. The French under Napoleon were more generous in preferring works of art.

The author makes Napoleon say on this occasion, when the officers entreated him to relinquish the St. Jerome of Correggio, for the sum of two millions of francs. "*The two millions of francs would soon be spent, but the Correggio would remain an ornament of the city of Paris for ages, and inspire the production of future master-pieces.*"

This is nevertheless he whom the author before accused of having no taste for the fine arts!!!

Is it then so difficult for the author, according to this answer, to justify the motive which made Napoleon prefer works of art? It was a motive too great and too praise-worthy to need justification;

if the author did not press it, it was not only because he did not wish to do so, but because he, on the contrary, endeavoured to alter its signification; in the same manner he gives to Napoleon the qualification of the devoted agent of the Directory, which the whole work of Walter Scott disproves, thus manifesting the blindness and the ill will of hatred.

*Vol. III. page 254.*—"The conqueror of the best generals and most disciplined troops in Europe, within a few months after he had been a mere soldier of fortune, seeking rather for subsistence than expecting honourable distinction," &c.

However unwilling I may feel to renew the subject of these mean and false invectives, I must nevertheless express the opinions they give rise to, even while I repress the disgust and contempt they inspire.

What does Walter Scott understand by a soldier of fortune? Before the revolution those were so called in France, who, commencing as common soldiers, rose to rank; and we find even according to the statement of the author, that the military career of Napoleon did not so commence, but that he was entitled by his birth and by his superior acquirements, to take rank amongst the officers of the celebrated corps of artillery. One may imagine that in England those are called soldiers of fortune who enter the service of the East India Company to conquer without difficulty an ignorant people, and to enrich themselves as easily with their spoils or their

traffic; but the expression, soldier of fortune, cannot be applied to Napoleon, unless it merely signifies that he owed his advancement solely to his military success; and certainly in this case the taunt the author addresses to him fails in its effect.

With regard to the situation in which Napoleon found himself some months before, the author is not ignorant that he was general in chief of the army of the interior of Paris, and that shortly before he commanded the warriors to whom the author gives the nick-names of Carmagnoles and Sans-culottes, but who, notwithstanding with small numbers and but few cannon, drove the combined fleet of England and Spain from the roads of Toulon, after having destroyed their army by land, carried at the point of the sword the forts which treason had delivered up to the English army, and made prisoner General O'Hara, its commander in chief. It is in vain for the author to seek to apply this passage to the short interval which Napoleon passed without employment at Paris. I have already said that his distress at this period is entirely false; although he was unemployed, he nevertheless retained his rank and pay as a general officer.

He was called to and consulted in the committee of war, and it was to the high opinion the members of this committee formed of his genius and great character so well tried at the siege of Toulon, that he owed the command on the 13th vendémiaire, and afterwards that of the army of Italy.

Vol. III. page 264.—The ~~same~~ Bonaventure Bonaparte here mentioned is the canonized Bonaventure Bonaparte whose body I myself saw, in my journey to Bologna on the 3d. September, 1817, in the chapel of St. Jerome, belonging to the Ghisilieri family, in the church of Santa Maria de la Vita.

#### APPENDIX TO THE 3d VOLUME.

Page 3.—Count Pozzo di Borgo was a person of estimation in the town of Ajaccio, who daily visited the family of Bonaparte, but he was no relation to them. At the period of Paoli's treason Pozzi di Borgo emigrated first into England, and afterwards into Russia.

The pretended banishment of the family of Bonaparte from Corsica is a fable. Corsica had during twenty-five years appertained to France. Paoli himself had received from the government the military command of Corsica: who then had the right to banish the Bonaparte family? They left the town of Ajaccio and Corsica solely on account of the surrender of the island to the enemy, and first retired to La Valette near Toulon, and afterwards to Marseilles.

Vol. III. page 8.—“He invited Monsieur Joly to visit him at Auxonne, with a view to print and publish this work. He came, and found the future emperor in a naked barrack room, the ~~only~~ furniture of which consisted of a wretched bed without curtains, a table placed in the embrasure of a window, loaded

with books and papers, and two chairs. His brother Louis, whom he was teaching mathematics, lay on a wretched mattress in an adjoining closet. Monsieur Joly and the author agreed on the price of the impression of the book, but Napoleon was at the time in uncertainty whether he was to remain at Auxonne or not. Shortly after, he was ordered to Toulon, where his extraordinary career first commenced. The work on Corsica was never printed, nor has a trace of it been discovered. Monsieur Joly, naturally desirous of preserving every recollection of this interview with the future conqueror of nations in the character and condition of a Grub-street author, mentions that the clerical dress and ornaments of the chaplain of the regiment, whose office had been just suppressed, were deposited with Napoleon by the other officers. He showed them to his visiter, and spoke of the ceremonies of religion without indecency, yet also without respect. 'If you have not heard mass to-day, I can say it to you,' was his expression to Monsieur Joly."

This passage contains almost as many falsehoods as lines. I remember very well that on my account my brother had more convenient and more roomy quarters allotted to him than to the other officers of the same rank. The furniture could not be better or worse than that of the other officers, since they were all in barracks, and consequently lodged and furnished by the state. I recollect that I had a very good room and a very good bed. My brother directed my studies, but I had the necessary masters, even in literature.

The phrase, "*Napoleon was at the time in uncertainty whether he was to remain at Auxonne or not,*" appears to indicate that he was undecided whether he should follow the example of many of his com-

rades who emigrated. Indecision was not a part of his character, and he never hesitated upon the conduct he should adopt. He was not, as it is said, sent shortly after to Toulon; *shortly after* he was passed by promotion into the regiment of Grenoble, in garrison at Valence, and I followed him there. From thence he went to Corsica on leave of absence for six months, to prepare himself for his campaign, and I followed him there also; but during his leave of absence, he was elected lieutenant-colonel in a newly-raised regiment of infantry, without losing his rank in the artillery of the line, in consequence of the military regulations of the period, made to induce officers of the line to enter among the fresh troops. I remained with my family. On the return of the expedition from Sardinia, and after the treason of Paoli, Napoleon rejoined his regiment (the 4th artillery) at Nice, and my family retired first to La Valette, near Toulon, and thence to Marseilles, as has been already said.

It was after this that Napoleon was chosen to inspect the different arsenals, in order to form a besieging equipment, indispensable to the army; and it was on his return from this mission only, and on his passage to Marseilles, that he was put in *requisition* to replace in the army of Toulon General Domartin, commandant of the artillery of the siege, who had just been severely wounded.

I am ignorant of what is related of Napoleon regarding the ornaments of the church, but I can

affirm that at this time I received my first communion in consequence of his care and exhortations.

It was he who gave me the necessary instructions and preparations, through the medium of a worthy ecclesiastic, the brother of Madame de Pillon, an old lady of consideration, whose house was frequented every evening by the society of Auxonne.

I was a child at this period; but as I perfectly recollect all that I relate, I should also recollect having seen the ornaments here named, and the proposals attributed to my brother, if the statement was true, since I can very well recollect that I went to mass on Sundays and festivals, with the whole regiment assembled in a body.

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#### VOLUME IV.

Page 50. At the beginning of this volume the author dilates with great complacency on the chimerical projects he attributes to Napoleon. Let me be allowed to observe that Walter Scott may possibly have partaken in the opinion of a great number of persons respecting Napoleon's sentiments concerning the expedition to Egypt, but I cannot do the same.

I was aide-de-camp to my brother from the com-

mencement of the campaigns in Italy, and I accompanied him in this capacity to Egypt; and although I remained in that country but a short time, yet as I received the double mission of carrying to the Directory the first colours taken in Egypt, of giving an account of the situation of the army and demanding the necessary reinforcements, I had the means of forming an opinion upon this expedition as correct as that of others.

The conquest of Malta and the colonization of Egypt had the greatest influence upon the prosperity of our commerce in the Levant and in India, as well as upon our navy; it would have been attacking England in India, slowly it is true, but with the greatest efficacy, notwithstanding the immense strength of the English navy, and that without running the chances of an expedition by land to India, which as it appears to me was impossible. This project was in itself sufficiently great and sufficiently glorious without its being necessary to imagine the extravagant project of dethroning the Grand Signor, &c.

The issue of the attack upon Malta and the descent in Egypt, in spite of the English fleets and the skill of Nelson, have demonstrated the justice of these calculations, as even the loss of the battle of Aboukir has proved to all who like myself witnessed it, that France may have an efficient navy whenever it is seriously desired, or rather whenever it is undertaken to complete its organization and administration.

All that the author says against the expedition to India by land is not only exaggerated, but is below the truth. It is not by open force that India may be attacked by crossing Egypt and Arabia, but by establishing and consolidating a French force in Egypt, by opening the ancient communication by Suez, by multiplying the relations between Egypt and India, and in short by so augmenting the French navy in the Mediterranean that this sea should become almost inaccessible to the English squadrons.

Vol. 4, page 60.—The author says that the proclamation of Napoleon to the army, on their departure from Toulon was a mixture of bombast and bad taste; and as this observation proceeds from the author of romances so frequently filled with tavern scenes, it appears to me to be quite natural.

Vol. IV. page 81.—I know not if it be true that the Archbishop of Malines, ambassador to Warsaw, made use of the expression of Jupiter Scapin towards Napoleon; it appears to me incontestable that the name of Scapin would have been much more justly applied to the writer, a bishop and an ambassador, who could be capable of indulging in such an impertinence towards the sovereign he represented.

The mean digression of the author upon the project he attributes to Napoleon of turning Mussulman is worthy of the author of so many fictions.

*Vol. IV. page 91.*—"But the same Deity, who rendered that gulph fatal to Pharaoh, had reserved for one, who equally defied and disowned his power, the rocks of an island in the midst of the Atlantic."

What cruel irony! I will even dare to call it ferocious, towards an enemy who was but too confiding and who has so long been dead!!!

I feel assured that no Englishman of feeling and reflection can approve the cruel raillery, and I may add, the unworthy triumph of a *soldier of the pen*, upon the melancholy and the miserably prolonged end of an enemy, whose greatest fault was a blind confidence in the generosity of a government, which was his chief enemy.

*Vol. IV. page 84.*—It is false that in Egypt he showed himself almost persuaded of the truth of the mission of Mahomet. He proclaimed that the Mus-sulman religion was that of the country, and ought to be respected and even protected. He conducted himself in Egypt with a prudence and a policy, dictated as much by equity as by solicitude for the preservation of the army. Doubtless, deceit and falsehood should be banished from the language of real policy, since as government ought to be, as much as is in the power of man, the image of God upon earth, its language can and ought to be that of truth and justice. This however does not preclude the right of proclaiming and respecting the religious worship and opinions of a conquered nation, and it was in this sense that the proclamations addressed

by Napoleon to the Mussulmen should be regarded; I consider them as a manifestation of toleration on the part of the French army towards the conquered people of the East. They would not have been understood by these people if they had not spoken their language; and to give an idea of their pertinacity on this head I can affirm, that whilst I was in Holland, I remarked upon and rejected at first the title of Emperor given to the King of Holland by the sublime Porte; and upon expressing my astonishment, I was assured that the Sublime Porte gave this title to the sovereigns of other countries, and that that of king would not be understood. I know not whether this custom still exists in Constantinople, but I can affirm that it was in use in 1807.

*Vol. IV. page 197.*—"Buonaparte, who had first shaken the papal authority, and in doing so, as he boasted in his Egyptian proclamations, had destroyed the emblem of Christian worship."

The author is deceived or feigns to be deceived. It was not Napoleon who had first shaken the papal authority; on the contrary, he prevented its falling at the peace of Tolentino, probably contrary to the instructions of his government. He was politic, prudent, and adroit towards the Mussulmen of Egypt; he was conscientious as well as politic towards the ministers of his own religion, as his death has proved.

There are no observations to be made upon the numerous similes of the author, too nearly resem-

bling those of the taverns of his romances, or rather too many might be made; one can but despise and pity their author, who, imagining he is writing an offensive history of France and Napoleon, has only compiled all the follies and calumnies, scattered throughout the libels of the period, to which he has found the means of adding more.

This voluminous satire has one undeniable advantage, that of presenting a collection of all the calumnies and invectives uttered for thirty years against Napoleon.

Historians are ordinarily led to consider their heroes with too much benevolence; it is not a reproach which can be brought against Walter Scott. At every step may be traced proofs of the plan of calumny which he laid down for himself.

He says on the occasion of the battle of Novi, and on the death of Joubert, "*it has been rumoured, certainly without the least probability, that he did not fall by the fire of the Austrians, but by that of assassins hired by the family of Napoleon, to take out of the way a powerful competitor of their brother.*"

He then adds that it is without the slightest probability—that it would have been a very gratuitous crime, since they could neither reckon with certainty on the arrival of Bonaparte, nor upon his being adopted by Sieyes. Why then may we ask him, do you record such an atrocity? It can only be be-

cause you are aware that some portion of a calumny always continues to be believed.

We find with surprise the Convention named as a body existing in 1802. This proves with what inexactitude and with what contempt for his readers the author has compiled his work.

It is with equal veracity he affirms in the same volume that Napoleon would not begin the revolution of the 18th brumaire on the 17th, because that day was a Friday, and that he was superstitious!!! Probably then in all his wars, he always rested on a Friday!!!

I do not know whether what is said of the conduct of Bernadotte on the 18th brumaire is true; I do know that I was at the breakfast given by Bernadotte at this time, and that Napoleon could not take part in it. It is said that the former refused his co-operation on account of his republican principles; but neither he nor Moreau, nor any one whatever, could have prevented Napoleon from attaining the government; he was elevated to it by public opinion, the army, and the whole nation, as light bodies are raised by the waves. The author of the historical romances must pardon me this bombast.

## VOLUME V.

That which Walter Scott advances in the beginning of the fifth volume, concerning the blameable policy of Napoleon with respect to the Swiss, when he gave them his act of mediation, is not only false but calumnious, and I will prove it to be so. I was in Switzerland in 1814, after the invasion of the allies, and certainly this was the period of the greatest enmity and malignity towards Napoleon; it was the epoch of the calumniators and libellers; there existed those who carried their effrontery so far as to declare that the name of Napoleon was not his own, and that he was called Nicholas. Nevertheless even at this period, some of the deputies of the diet, and the landammans of the different cantons, and the principal Swiss, who frequented the baths of Baden, near Zurich, where I then was, did not refrain from openly declaring that they could not complain of the Emperor Napoleon, that he had put an end to their difficulties, secured their existence, and that they could feel nothing but gratitude towards him.

This assertion does not need proofs, since those of whom I speak and whom I knew in Switzerland, must still remember what I now affirm, and it seems to me that this opinion of the Swiss is sufficiently conclusive.

Vol. V. pages 92 and 93.—“England, he said, must have ended, by becoming an appendage to the France of *my* system. Nature has made it one of our islands, as well as Oleron and Corsica.”

“Even if London had been lost, we would not, under so great a calamity, have despaired of the freedom of the country.”

I commanded a brigade of the army of the coasts, united at this period against England, and I remember, that when called upon to give my opinion upon this expedition, I replied *that a maritime expedition unless it had the superiority at sea, appeared to me to be a contradiction.* Nevertheless, let any one imagine, a French army of two hundred thousand men, landing upon the English territory, and seizing upon the immense city of London, would he dare deny that if the liberty of the country had not even been lost, England would have suffered an immense and perhaps irreparable injury? It cannot be denied that the plan was well conceived; that the combined fleets of France and Spain were sufficient to sweep the channel, and to command there during the time necessary to seize upon London, and even to have conveyed the whole army back to France.

Vol. V. page 111.—I deplore more than any one else the catastrophe of the Duke D'Enghien; but as Napoleon has himself spoken of it, it does not become me to add another word. I shall only observe that this affair is far from having been cleared up, that it was impossible that Napoleon should have brought the Prince to Paris to be immolated; that he who established a Bourbon in Tuscany, had

quite a contrary design, and one which could but be favourable; else why cause so distinguished a Prince to make a journey to Paris when his presence in traversing France could but be dangerous.

If it be asked why the commendable design attributed to Napoleon was not followed up, and was so cruelly changed, I cannot explain; but I am persuaded that impartial history will one day reveal this secret.

With respect to the prisoners of Jaffa, &c. (see Vol. IV. page 113,) Alexander in burning a city, in killing his friend and preceptor; Charlemagne in massacring millions of Saxons; Titus himself in surrounding his lines with crucified Jews, in assassinating *Aulus Cecina* on quitting a banquet because he had committed treason by destroying a million of Jews in the war with Judea; these facts have taught me to hold in contempt the renown of the conqueror, and even the victory, which is and can only be acquired by the commission of the greater part of these horrors. With respect to the other accusations brought against Napoleon, I may be permitted to recal to Sir Walter Scott his own maxim.

*Vol. IV. page 115.*—"But though popular credulity eagerly receives whatever stories are marked by the horrible and wonderful, history, on the contrary, demands direct evidence, and the existence of powerful motives, for whatever is beyond the ordinary bounds of credibility."

If there ever was a man whose destiny was mark-

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ed out even at his birth, that man was surely Napoleon. As soon as he could comprehend it, and he did comprehend it on emerging from childhood, he proceeded in his career with as much genius as courage and ardour; but it is false that he allowed himself to be seduced by the sole love of power without any moral and great end; his intentions on the contrary were as great as they were noble and generous; I have heard him incessantly declare, *that from him should date the era of representative governments; that it was not necessary to do every thing by the people, but for the people, &c., that the abolition of privileges, the equality of rights, that public and impartial justice were the foundations of all society, &c.* But he passionately loved military fame and war; and an enthusiast for the glory and supremacy of France, he desired that every thing without exception should contribute towards this end.

If he is not beyond the reach of criticism, I will even say, if he deceived himself, who amongst the great departed was more irreproachable than he? Let us reflect upon the difficulties Napoleon had to overcome, the innumerable enemies, both external as well as internal, he had to combat, the snares of all kinds which were laid for him on every side, the continual tension of his mind, his incessant activity, the extraordinary fatigues he had to encounter, and criticism will soon be absorbed by admiration.

Vol. V. page 195 to 201.—The author blames the violation of the territory of Bareuth; but how

little these neutralities have been respected by conquerors! Witness the invasion of Switzerland at the end of 1813, so fatal to France!

The conduct of Prussia at the period of the battle of Austerlitz was conformable to the wholesome policy which had so long connected this power with France. It is not for us, Frenchmen, to reproach her inaction at this important crisis, even while criticizing her raising the shield before Jena. Until then Prussia had showed herself reasonable in not allowing herself to be dragged into new coalitions. It is unjustly and with untruth that she is reproached with defection in 1813. What man of good faith could believe her alliance to be voluntary, and consequently real, when the country was reduced by our victories to the most deplorable condition?

Vol. V. page 207.—The author makes the little village of Saint Michel, near Verona, a city, as the mountain of Corona, near Rivoli. However puerile these inaccuracies may be, I cannot avoid remarking them.

Vol. V. page 262 to 263.—“Thus he imagines that the defeat of the Nile might have been prevented, had the headmost vessels of the French line, instead of remaining at anchor, slipped their cables, and borne down to the assistance of those which were first attacked by the British. But in urging this, the leading principle of the manœuvre of breaking the line, had totally escaped the French Emperor. It was the boast of the patriotic sage, who illustrated and recommended this most important system of naval tactics, that it could serve the purpose of a British fleet only. The general principle is briefly

this:—By breaking through the line, a certain number of ships are separated from the rest, which the remainder must either abandon to their fate by sailing away, or endeavour to save by bearing down, or doubling as it were upon the assailants, and engaging in a close and general engagement. Now, this last alternative is what Buonaparte recommends—what he would certainly have practised on land—and what he did practise, in order to extricate his right wing, at Marengo. But the relative superiority of the English navy is so great, that, while it is maintained, a close engagement with an enemy in the least approaching to equality, is equivalent to a victory; and to recommend a plan of tactics which should render such a battle inevitable, would be, in other words, advising a French admiral to lose his whole fleet, instead of sacrificing those ships which the English manœuvre had cut off, and crowding sail to save such as were yet unengaged.”

If it were permitted to a man whose only campaign at sea was that of Egypt in the vessel of Brueys, to speak of naval tactics, I could easily refute all that Sir Walter Scott has here said; I shall limit myself to the relation of the observations made with General Kleber, when from the neighbouring coast we witnessed the battle of Aboukir. The greater part of our squadron remained inactive while the English turned the left; there was not a single spectator who was not irritated at seeing the six vessels on the right of the squadron, commanded by Brueys, keep their line, when if they had hoisted sail, and fallen back on the left, they would have put the English between two fires, and would certainly have gained the victory, as is easily proved, for although the left was turned, the Orient alone put hors de combat three English ships, and at the end of the battle the whole victorious

squadron could not prevent Villeneuve from setting sail with two ships and two frigates, although these four vessels were warmly attacked.

Every one ought without any doubt to defend the honour of his flag; but the history of the French navy proves that it was to their tactics that the English sailors owed their superiority, and that ship to ship the victory was more frequently on the side of the French Marine.

The author repeats (vol. V. page 262) some hideous accusations—it is thus he himself terms them—upon the manners of Napoleon and other members of my family. Nevertheless he adds immediately afterwards, that such enormities do not belong to the character of Bonaparte; why then consign a place in his book to these hideous circumstances, so slightly proved and so little worthy of history? This is the more astonishing, as the following remarkable passage appears in the same work: “*We reject without hesitation an accusation too hideous to be mentioned, and which ought never to be named without very evident proof to support it.*”

It is singular enough that he thus condemns himself.

He says on the subject of myself and brothers, (vol. V. page 254,) that we were “destined to form such political alliances as might best suit his views. They belonged, he said, in the decree creating

them, entirely to the country, and must therefore lay aside every sentiment of individual feeling, when the public weal required such a sacrifice." We read further on—

*Vol. V. page 262.*—"Germany also was doomed to find more than one appanage for the Buonaparte family."

*Vol. V. page 268.*—"At this period also Buonaparte began first to display a desire of engrafting his family upon the ancient dynasties of Europe."

*Vol. V. page 209.*—"He distributed crowns among his kindreds as ordinary men give vails to their domestics."

It would be difficult to make these different assertions agree. The truth is, Napoleon never wished or pretended to give appanages, but to act as he thought right towards France, and this design was as great as it was noble and generous; exaggeration only deforms it.

*Vol. V. page 266.*—"In devolving the crown of Holland on the son of Louis, after the abdication of Louis," &c.

This inadvertency is too strong. After my abdication the crown belonged to my eldest son; I left it to him. I had caused him to be acknowledged; but so far from giving it to him, it was not even reserved for him; it was taken from him, Holland was reunited to France, and my son removed to Paris.

No doubt it is allowable to write historical romances thus, but not history.

*Vol. V. page 337.*—"Napoleon declared, according to his usual form of dethronement, that the house of Hesse-Cassel had ceased to reign. The doom was executed even before it was pronounced. Louis Bonaparte, with Marshal Mortier, had possessed himself of Hesse-Cassel by the first of November.

This is not correct; I had put myself at this period at the head of my own troops and some French regiments then in Holland, because the Emperor required the King of Holland, to form a combined army at Wesel, under the title of the army of the North. Endeavouring as much as possible to reconcile my very different duties, I marched towards Cassel at the orders of Marshal Mortier, who was advancing upon Mayence with a small number of troops. When I approached Cassel, Marshal Mortier had entered the evening before. I immediately halted the body of the army before I entered the town, and leaving the French troops under the command of Marshal Mortier, I retook the route to Holland with the Dutch.

I caused the Elector to be informed by the Baron de Gilsa, despatched before me, that I entreated this sovereign not to quit his states, under the risk of losing them; but he erroneously distrusted this advice, and when I arrived within sight of Cassel the Elector was gone, and Marshal Mortier had occupied the town since the previous evening. If the Elector had taken my advice and remained at Cassel, he would probably not then have lost his states.

I only passed the night at Cassel, at the house of

the French minister, and departed thence after having paid a visit to the Electress.

I do not believe Napoleon then intended to erect Hesse into a kingdom; but on attacking Prussia he would not leave the Elector, a Prussian general, at the head of an army and of a warlike population, in the rear of the French army. He could, and perhaps he ought, to have taken military possession of Hesse, as the Elector was a general in the service of Prussia, with whom France was at war; but he must have confined himself to this, and no doubt Napoleon would so have restricted himself if the Elector had remained in his capital, in compliance with the advice I gave him. I cannot imagine why the author did not consult the *Documents upon Holland*, relating to what personally regards myself.

*Vol. V. pages 346, 347.* "Douaniers, magistrates, generals, and prefects, nay, some of the kindred princes of the house of Napoleon, were well pleased to listen to the small still voice of their interest, rather than to his authoritative commands; and the British commerce, though charged with heavy expenses, continued to flourish in spite of the continental system."

The accusation thus brought might also fall upon me; and although I consider myself beyond the reach of such calumnies, I must declare, in answer to the frequent insinuations made during and even since the reign of my brother, that such an accusation is as false as it is inconceivable. I declare I was in no manner a partisan of the continental system; first, because it injured Holland more than it

did England, and it was the interest of Holland which concerned me most deeply ; and in the second place, because this system, though true in theory, was false in its application.

I compare it to a sieve, a single hole is sufficient to render it incapable of containing any thing.

The continental system being acted upon in most countries, must have produced more beneficial results in those points where it was not maintained, and thus it was with respect to the advantages it conferred upon English commerce, mentioned by Walter Scott. It was this which gave France the means of benefiting her merchants, to the injury of those of other countries, who had not the power to open and shut their ports at will.

It will consequently be supposed that I could only lend myself partially without zeal or pleasure to the continental system, since it was both against my own opinion and against the interest of the country, and I was convinced of its inefficacy against England ; but at the same time I may declare, since all this is now a mere matter of history, that I did not hesitate to obey all that was required with respect to the pretended blockade of England, but I repeat that it was against my own opinion, and consequently without zeal and without pleasure.

Vol. V. page 351.—We have here a critique upon the policy of Napoleon towards Poland, which I

shall not stop to examine. It is but too easy to criticise the actions of statesmen, when time in its rapid course has unveiled the causes and effects of events: when the game is finished, the spectators have no longer any credit in discovering what the players ought to have done.

*Vol. V. page 402.*—"Russia ceded the Lordship of Jever to Holland, as an ostensible compensation for her new acquisition."

This does not appear to me to be correct; according to the terms of the treaty, this country was ceded personally to me, and my first act was to unite it to Holland. I establish this fact merely for the sake of truth.

## VOLUME VI.

*Pages 42, 43.* "Those who practise calumny know, according to the vulgar expression, that if they do but throw dirt sufficient, some part of it will adhere."

It is no doubt for this reason that the author has accumulated all the follies uttered against Napoleon during thirty years. He was, as he avows, not ignorant of this vulgar maxim.

*Vol. VI. page 113.* "So much did he (Napoleon) rely upon the celerity of movement, that if an officer asked time to execute any of his commands, it was frequently his remarkable answer—'Ask me for any thing except time.' That celerity

depended on the uncompromising system of forced marches, without established magazines, and we have described how wasteful it must have been to human life."

This is false; activity of movement and rapidity of attack are as conducive to the well-being of mankind as they are favourable to victory.

Where has he learned that the system of forced marches pursued by the Emperor Napoleon was always without magazines? On the contrary, his administrative system was admirable, and his calculations on this head worthy of his plans; without the one the other could not have succeeded.

That an author who is not a soldier may accumulate blunders, calumnies, and erroneous theories upon the civil and political actions of him of whom he calls himself the historian, I can readily conceive, but I confess I cannot conceive, how he dare criticise the systems, theory and tactics of an army and a leader who were almost always invincible, who were constantly the models and admiration even of their enemies, of all true soldiers, although not of those who treat of subjects of which they have always been ignorant.

And here we may make a melancholy reflection, that fame is not only vain but often painful, since it exposes those who have attained it by so much labour, so many fatigues, and lofty deeds, to be the sport of idleness, of malignity, and calumny.

*Vol. VI. page 120.*—"Nor is England interested in depriving other states of their fleets or their armies."

We can but be astonished at the boldness of this assertion; why then did she once seize upon the Danish fleet? Did France in the zenith of her power ever commit so blameable an act?

*Vol. VI. page 173.*—"It was said that the subordinate parties (Joseph and Murat) were alike disappointed with the parts assigned them in this masque of sovereigns."

I refer to Madame de Stael to state what then passed; but nevertheless I demand of the libellers when these vicissitudes and changes will, according to them, cease to deserve this name? When have they ever taken place without the estates and destinies of man becoming the price of them? These masquerades, like all the affairs of this world, cease to be farcical only through the justice and humanity, or the integrity of individuals.

*Vol. VI. page 336.*—"But the French saw the necessity of treading out this spark, which might so easily have excited a conflagration. A large force of Dutch and Danish troops advanced to Stralsund on the 31st of May, and in their turn forced their way into the place."

I must here observe that it was the Dutch themselves, who, stationed in Westphalia, marched against and seized upon Stralsund; the Danes assisted the Dutch.

*Vol. VI. page 345.*—"Next we must point out the extreme inconsistency betwixt the praise assigned to Napoleon as the

destroyer of revolutionary practices, the friend and supporter of tottering thrones, and that which is at the same time claimed for him by himself and his advocates, as the actual Messiah of the said revolution, whose name was to be distinguished by posterity as being connected with it."

Let the reader take the trouble of comparing what is here said with page 208 of vol. VIII. quoted in these observations, and he will be convinced of the most manifest contradiction.—"*Whose name was to be distinguished by posterity as being connected with it!!!*"

Here then stands confessed the intention of the singular historian of Napoleon, that of charging him in the eyes of posterity with the excess and horror of the revolution; but it is not thus that Napoleon will be signalized to posterity. The author would manifest too little judgment and memory if he really believed it.

He confounds also the object of the revolution with its horrors. Napoleon may well have said uncontradicted, *that from him would date the era of representative governments*—that is to say, of monarchical governments, but founded upon the laws. He might have added, without contradiction or exaggeration, that he had put an end to the atrocities of the revolution and to popular fury, the renewal of which he prevented.

Exaggeration is the enemy of truth; those who would prove too much, prove nothing. Impartial posterity will perhaps reproach Napoleon with not

having kept an even way between the weakness of Louis XVI. and an inflexible firmness. It will reproach him with not having confided the preservation of the rights and the newly-obtained advantages of the nation to fundamental and stable laws, instead of making them rest solely on his own existence. But I am greatly deceived if it will confirm the prediction of the author—but I believe that it will divide the good and the advantages of the French revolution from its excesses and horrors, the end and suppression of which it will attribute to Napoleon.

*Vol. VI. page 357.*—"Bernadotte hesitated to accept the defence of Antwerp; but having at length done so, he availed himself of the time afforded by the English to put the place in a complete state of defence, and assembled within, and under its walls, above thirty thousand men. The country was inundated by opening the sluices; strong batteries were erected on both sides of the Scheldt, and the ascending that river became almost impossible."

Let me be allowed here to repeat what I have said on this subject in the *Documents sur la Hollande*, and to correct some inaccuracies.

It was not Bernadotte whom the Arch-Chancellor Cambaceres and the Duke de Feltre, minister of war, requested to undertake the defence of Antwerp, but it was I who received several couriers on this subject, and who in fact took the command of the combined army, sufficiently in time to prevent the English surprising Antwerp as they already had done Walcheren. It was I who flooded the

borders of the Scheldt and erected batteries there. Although Holland was without troops, since I was compelled to keep them in Westphalia, I found means by an appeal to the nation to assemble sufficient troops at Bergen-op-Zoom, in the island of Lower Beveland, and under the walls of Antwerp, to cover all this part and to prevent the English from making any progress. The Prince de Ponte-Corvo arrived a fortnight afterwards, and in pursuance of the orders of the Emperor and the Duke de Feltre, which were officially communicated to me, I resigned the command to him. It is thus proved that it was the Emperor himself who nominated the Prince de Ponte-Corvo, and that all that has been published on this subject in the libels, and chiefly in the memoirs of Fouché, is perfectly false. I am surprised to find such mistakes in a work calling itself historical.

*Vol. VI. pages 364, 365.*—"Napoleon was himself an Italian, and showed his sense of his origin by the particular care which he always took of that nation, where, whatever benefits his administration conferred on the people, reached them both more profusely and more directly than in any other part of his empire. That swelling spirit entertained the proud, and could it have been accomplished consistently with justice, the noble idea, of uniting the beautiful peninsula of Italy into one kingdom, of which Rome should once more be the capital. He also nourished the hope of clearing out the Eternal City from the ruins in which she was buried, of preserving her ancient monuments, and of restoring what was possible of her ancient splendour. Such ideas as these, dearer to Napoleon, because involving a sort of fame which no conquest elsewhere could be attended with, must have had charms for a mind which constant success had pallied to the ordinary enjoyment of victory; and

no doubt the recollection that the existence of the Pope as a temporal prince was totally inconsistent with this fair dream of the restoration of Rome and Italy, determined his resolution to put an end to his power."

The observations to be made on this passage are numerous; I must therefore limit them.

Napoleon was of Italian origin, but he was born a Frenchman. Perhaps it may be asked for what purpose are these continual repetitions of his Italian origin? and in truth it is difficult to comprehend their end. His partiality for Italy was natural enough, since he had conquered it, and this beautiful peninsula was a trophy of the national glory, of which Walter Scott allows Napoleon to have been very jealous.

I nevertheless doubt whether he had the intention of uniting Italy and making Rome its capital; many actions of Napoleon's contradict these suppositions of the author.

I was near him one day when he received by an aide-de-camp from General Soult (if I mistake not) the report of some victories in Spain, and amongst others of one in which the Italian troops had greatly distinguished themselves. One of the persons who were with him exclaimed at this news—that the Italians would show themselves worthy of obtaining their independence, and it was to be desired that the whole of Italy should be united into one national body. HEAVEN PREVENT IT (cried Napoleon, with spontaneous and involuntary emotion) THEY WOULD SOON BE MASTERS OF THE GAULS.

With regard to the removal of the monuments of antiquity, and to the works undertaken for their preservation, they were not merely projected; they were not only begun, but even far advanced, and many of them finished. The works which have been completed since the time of Napoleon were finished upon the plans left by him.

If Walter Scott had been in Italy and at Rome in 1814, he must have known that on this head I advance nothing but what is true; and if he was not there, the greater number of his countrymen who travelled in Italy at that period can contradict him.

Amongst all the calumnies accumulated against Napoleon, there are none more unjust or false than those which attack his patriotism; he was essentially French, indeed too exclusively so; all excess is bad.

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## VOLUME VII.

*Vol. VII. page 65.*—The idea of endeavouring to know on what terms peace could be obtained, had occurred to Napoleon as well as to Fouché, and the Sovereign, on his part, unsuccessful as he had been on two occasions, in his attempt to open a personal correspondence with the King of England, had followed the steps of his minister, in making Monsieur Labouchère, a commercial person, agent of a great Dutch mercantile establishment, the medium of communication with the British government. The consequence was, that Ouvrard and the

agent of the Emperor, neither of whom knew of the other's mission, entered about the same time into correspondence with the Marquis Wellesley, who returned from his Spanish mission, was now Secretary at War. The British statesman, surprised at this double application, became naturally suspicious of some intended deception, and broke off all correspondence both with Ouvrard and his competitor for the office of negotiator.

“Napoleon must naturally have been so highly incensed with Fouché, for tampering without his consent in a matter of such vital consequence, that one is almost surprised to find him limiting the effects of his resentment to disgracing the minister. He sent for Fouché, and having extorted from him an avowal of his secret negotiation, he remarked, ‘So, then, you make peace or war without my leave?’”

Although the author does not mention me, I am able to speak pertinently to this affair; the following is the truth:—

I went to Paris from Holland in 1809, against my inclination, to comply with the wish of the principal Dutch, who imagined that I could prevent or at least adjourn by my presence in Paris, and my immediate efforts, the very visible intention of seizing upon Holland.

During my stay at Paris, I was persuaded that all the tricks, the attacks and ill-treatment of which I was the object, had not for their real end the union of Holland, since it was the interest of France to aggrandize that kingdom, but that it was a political stratagem, to induce the English government to report its decrees of council and to conclude the peace; and I was therefore prevailed upon while in Paris, to send M. La Bouchère from Amsterdam to

London with instructions to make known to the Marquis Wellesley, that if England did not report its decrees of council the union of Holland, with France, would be inevitable.

The reply of the Marquis proved at once how favourable and agreeable my government in Holland had been to France, since the English government declared, *that the fate of Holland could not fail to occasion much interest in England; but that in the present state of that country the influence of France was so entire there, that the political change spoken of must have some weight in the determination of the British Cabinet.*

This attempt, like all those I made during my stay at Paris, having proved useless, I could only succeed in delaying the union of Holland, the decree for which being prepared beforehand, and always in readiness, was often placed before me, by sacrificing Brabant and Zealand.

I returned to Amsterdam after this, as after the loss of a most disastrous battle, but I still hoped to be able to prolong the nominal existence of the kingdom until the general peace, which I believed would follow upon the new marriage. In the meanwhile I was requested at Amsterdam to allow M. Ouvrard a passage to England. I consented to this the more willingly as I imagined that it was in consequence of the step I had already taken in sending M. La Bouchère to London.

A short time after the Emperor visited Antwerp and the provinces he had taken from Holland, I was with him in that city, in order to prevent his coming into the provinces still left to the kingdom.

Whilst I conversed with the Emperor, and repulsed with difficulty, but not without grief and disgust, the incessant complaints as unjust as they were false, of the communications which still existed between England and the coast of Holland, I assured him that since my return from Paris, there had been no communication with England except that which had taken place through M. Ouvrard, according to his request. My astonishment was extreme on learning that not only it was without his request, but that he was even ignorant of it, and from that moment he determined on the discharge of the Duke of Otranto, Fouché, as minister of the Police, who had allowed so singular a proceeding.

Vol. VII. page 77 to 87.—I am sincerely grateful for the manner in which the author expresses himself in my behalf, at the end of the third chapter, but I think it necessary to add this short explanation; if, by the treaty of the 16th of March, 1820, the union of Holland was retarded, it was only at the price of the cession of Brabant and Zealand, and in sacrificing what I considered the welfare of the country, and even my rank.

It was not as the author says, commercial affairs alone which caused me continual discussion and

torment, but all the affairs of the country as soon as they became favourable to its well-being and its political consolidation, because I cannot conceal it, and besides I should endeavour in vain to do so, the policy of the time was diametrically opposed to me, since its end, both in regard to the interior and exterior, whether in an open or secret manner, only tended to make this country fall of itself into the boundaries of the great empire.

It has been said, and the author here repeats it too lightly, that I lived in my retreat at Gratz after my abdication on a moderate pension, &c.

This is not correct; I did not, nor could not, receive a pension from any one; my revenue was derived principally from the sale of my decorations and jewels, and the interest of the obligations I had taken upon me in order to encourage the loan from Holland to Prussia at the time of the greatest misfortunes of the virtuous sovereign of that country, who, in spite of all opposition and every political consideration, was anxious to acquit himself towards me with scrupulous exactitude.

The eulogium which Walter Scott would here bestow upon me, proves his hostile sentiments towards Napoleon and all who bear his name.

He says that *I differed in sentiment from my brother only in regard to the continental system.* The result of

such an assertion would be too detrimental for me not to be anxious to remove it.

The reproaches or the criticisms addressed to a hero who has achieved so many great actions, the memory of which alone will be immortal, would totally annihilate the name and memory of a man like myself, who limited his fame to avoiding evil and doing some good. But Walter Scott will not leave me this feeble portion, and only consents to praise when it may injure my brother; I may therefore be permitted to reject it.

It was not only upon the continental system that we differed in opinion, but upon all which concerned Holland, the conscription, religion, war, commerce, &c. Perhaps I may be deceived, but it appears to me to be proved by experience, that if my opinion had been followed, Napoleon would still have been upon the throne.

I had wished, since a great state must necessarily exercise vast influence over others, that this influence should be the result of friendship, good understanding, reciprocal inclination, and the benevolence of the greater towards the lesser, in order that the interests of the latter should be found to agree with its inclination.

I detest as much as any one fanaticism, intolerance, prejudice; but I would only have desired reform in the article of religion, the most essential of

all, and that with the consent of the church, and the head of the church; I have thought that every sensible man, and above all the chief of the state, should set an example of implicit obedience to the established forms.

I was wrong about the war and the conscription, since I confess to have entertained on this head, even from my infancy, exaggerated ideas which unfortunately, experience instead of destroying, has only confirmed.

I have been as enthusiastic and joyful as any one else after a victory; but I also confess that even then the sight of a field of battle has not only struck me with horror, but even turned me sick; and now that I am advanced in life, I cannot understand any more than I could at fifteen years of age, how beings who call themselves reasonable, and who have so much foresight, can employ this short existence, not in loving and aiding each other and passing through it as gently as possible, but on the contrary, in endeavouring to destroy each other, as if time did not himself do this with sufficient rapidity!

What I thought at fifteen years of age, I still think; *war and the pain of death which society draws down upon itself, are but organized barbarisms, an inheritance of the savage state, disguised or ornamented by ingenious institutions and false eloquence.*

I participated in the just ideas of the Dutch re-

lating to commerce and the rights of nations; I wished for the liberty of the former, and to facilitate it by all possible but legitimate means. With respect to the second, I thought that friendship and treaties ought to be founded upon reciprocal utility, without considering the difference of strength and power in the contracting parties.

The attack upon Russia was so hazardous, that I cannot conceive how the Emperor Napoleon could decide upon it. I may be deceived, but I am internally convinced that this gigantic enterprise, as well as the affair of Spain, the invasion of Holland, and that of the States of the Church, were snares into which he was dragged by his extreme love of glory, and by a passion quite as immeasurable for the greatness and supremacy of France.

I had warned him for many years against two classes of enemies, the one, and perhaps both, represented by Fouché, who made golden bridges to withdraw his brothers from and to isolate Napoleon, in order to pursue with greater facility, the slow and gradual attacks upon his power and glory. Nevertheless in this campaign he surpassed himself.

Whatever might be the talent of the young and brilliant Segur, an officer cherished and distinguished by Napoleon, whom he ever followed as his Mareschal-des-logis, that is to say, almost in the capacity of his Aide-de-camp, this, even the

book of M. de Segur proves, contrary to the intention of the author, since he shows that almost all the generals were discouraged and alarmed at so great an undertaking, and that Napoleon alone never varied.

It was a spectacle unheard of in history, that of an army struggling in immense deserts, against nature, against innumerable enemies, who surrounded it on all sides, and every sort of suffering and privation.

It was a still greater spectacle, that of a chief, who by the force of his character, his activity and his genius, succeeded in rescuing himself from these enormous dangers. No—such a mind had lost neither its faculties nor its genius, and those who so accuse him, are as unjust as they are mean, since they display him rescued from these perils, after having persisted singly in the first idea of his enterprise, after having combated contrary opinions, and proved himself not to be cast down by reverses almost above the power of human nature to support. His losses were prodigious, but what was more prodigious was the way in which the French army extricated itself from the most frightful catastrophies on the plains of Lützen and Bautzen, where newly raised legions of conscripts, not only resisted but vanquished the old troops of Russia and Prussia, and an innumerable cavalry, and where Napoleon supplied the almost total loss of his artillery by heavy pieces of besieging ordnance. Let the pro-

fessed author of the History of Italy from 1789 to 1814, let the celebrated author of the historical romances, and so many other writers, who in their works go so far as to give lessons on tactics to the greatest tactician known since the world has existed—let these reproach such a man with having lost his reason, and treat him as Jupiter Scapin; as for me I think, and many others will be of my opinion, that such works prove rather that their authors have lost their senses, or that they write under the dishonourable influence of enmity and envy.

I am, as may be perceived, far from approving the expedition to Russia; but one must be blinded by animosity not to allow that resistance to the prodigious aggrandisement of this empire, and to the gigantic influence which menaced the whole of Europe, was a great, a politic, and a generous idea. Some young Russian officers, whom I had occasion to meet at the baths of Marienbad, in Bohemia, remarked in their youthful and perhaps imprudent but chivalrous and just language, *it is we who are now Romans*. Let us imagine the Russians masters of Constantinople, and who dare maintain that they will not become such of all Europe, not hereafter, but perhaps immediately, as they would possess an incontestable supremacy both by land and sea. As soon as Constantinople shall be in the power of the great Empire of the North, which will necessarily exercise a great influence over Greece, the English power at sea must soon give

way; and this is easy enough to prove, now that maritime exploits, or rather the prodigies of the Greeks in weak barks and light fire-ships, give token of what the same men would achieve when forming part of the navy of a great empire. The expedition to Russia, although bold, gigantic, and perhaps imprudent, without the re-establishment and aid of Poland, was nevertheless a great, heroic, and profoundly politic idea.

It is impossible that Napoleon should not have known, that if he succeeded in restraining the colossal power of that empire, or at least in preventing its enlargement, Poland would naturally have been re-constituted; and besides this would justify him for having conceded to Austria the adjournment of the re-establishment of the Polish kingdom.

Vol. VII. page 167, &c.—If all that the author here relates concerning the connexion between Sweden and France were true, the Emperor Napoleon would have been justified in his resentment and in his presages of the events which followed.


I do not pretend to blame the conduct of the Prince Royal of Sweden, for in quitting France he broke all ties with her, as he proves by his correspondence; nor do I pretend to rest my reproaches on his having been allied to our family. Who does not know how little these ties of family and relationship weigh against political relations?

The following passage closes these false and calumnious assertions.

*Vol. VII. page 172.*—"But this does not appear to have been in Buonaparte's nature, who, if he remembered benefits, had also a tenacious recollection of enmities, said to be peculiar to the natives of Corsica. When this feeling obtained the ascendancy, he was too apt to sacrifice his policy to his spleen."

If such had really been the character of Napoleon, would he not have had the means of preventing the Prince Royal of Sweden from accepting the high rank to which he was called? Did he sacrifice his policy to his vengeance? he who, after so often having seized upon his greatest enemies, restored them untouched? he who at the period of his marriage sacrificed his affections and placed on the throne which had cost so many toils and victories, the daughter of his enemy? he, in short, who betrayed a second time by fortune, sought an asylum with, and delivered himself up to the oldest, the most powerful, and most infuriated of his enemies? He will rather deserve the reproach of posterity for having been too facile after victory.

*Vol. VII. page 173.*—All that the author states relative to the injurious treatment of Prussia, &c. but chiefly concerning the injuries of the incomparable Queen of Prussia is just; I do not pretend to say that Napoleon was without passions; great men, however great they may be, have evils, errors, and faults to reproach themselves with, since they are but men; those who believe themselves exempt



from them, are never so little above humanity as when they set up so ridiculous a pretence. Prussia is the inseparable friend and ally of France. When policy is just, it cannot alter by age.

Vol. VII. page 229.—The non-establishment of Poland was, in my opinion, one of the chief causes of Napoleon's misfortunes; and if it be true, this re-establishment was rendered impossible, in consequence of his recent connexion with Austria, as it would have had the infallible result of arming his father-in-law against him; it is no less true, that this question was intimately connected with the expedition to Russia, which was rendered fruitless without the basis of Poland and the aid of its brave army, accustomed to the rigours of a Northern climate.

*Vol. VII. page 238.*—"All seem to have been sensible of an unusual slowness in Napoleon's motions on this important occasion; and Ségur attributes it to a premature decay of constitution, of which however, we see no traces in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814."

How does it happen that the English author is more just towards Napoleon than one of his generals? The author allows here what I have already observed—namely, the inconceivable accusation brought against the faculties of Napoleon at a time when he showed so much energy and perseverance, and when he not only resisted and extricated himself from the most frightful reverses imaginable, but even rose from them with surprising splendour.

In an operation as gigantic as the attack upon Russia, in a plan for the boldest campaign, prudence and extreme slowness were imperative. How then, under such circumstances, can a general officer, a pupil as it were, of Napoleon, criticise his stay at Wilna and the *extraordinary* slowness of his movements?

Would to Heaven that this delay had been carried far enough to prevent the grand army from crossing the Dnieper during this campaign! but the great inconvenience to Napoleon, as general of the grand army, was the necessity of not prolonging his absence from Paris, and consequently of terminating the campaign as quickly as possible; and this was another powerful reason why he should not have hazarded so distant an expedition.

*Vol. VII. pages 397 and 398.*—"On the 18th, in the evening, he arrived at Paris, where the city had been for two days agitated by the circulation of the 29th Bulletin, in which the veil, though with a reluctant hand, was raised up to show the disasters of the Russian war."

The author would certainly be singular in his opinion, if he did not do justice to the grandeur, simplicity, and frankness of the twenty-ninth bulletin, in which the most overwhelming disasters are related in the most sublime manner.

It is not writing history, when, as in this instance, the author's talent is employed to alter truth, and to sully not only the actions but even the writings of him of whom he calls himself the historian.

The twenty-ninth bulletin was not written with repugnance, but with profound resignation and a noble frankness, worthy of the event.

If the author wished to signify that Napoleon felt repugnance in relating his disasters, it was natural enough for him to do so; but the accusation is both unjust and false, for his enemies have reproached him with too much naivetè in this bulletin, and have exclaimed, "*To what purpose is it thus profoundly to afflict and alarm the whole nation?*"

Vol. VII. page 412, &c.—The author here gives free scope to his resentment against the Emperor and against France, by exaggerating the disasters of the Russian campaign, so painful not only to the French, but to all those who have a humane heart; he estimates the loss of the grand army at two hundred and fifty thousand men, not including prisoners, and it is but too true that the greater part were French. If any thing could be a consolation under so great a calamity, it was the conviction that not a man of the grand army ought to have escaped.

The author takes great pains to prove that the extraordinary severity of the winter was not the principal cause of this frightful catastrophe. He is facetious about the snow, to which he believes, or pretends to believe, that the twenty-ninth bulletin attributes the disaster; nevertheless it was not the snow alone, but a cold of thirty degrees. Besides,

have we not often known in the severe winters of the North of France, where the cold is but slight in comparison with that of Russia, have we not frequently known, I repeat, travellers to perish under the snow? How then can it be denied that the extraordinary severity of the winter was the cause of the disaster, when the horses all perished in one night, and consequently the army was without artillery, and without cavalry; when whole corps were stiffened and fell without the power of using their arms?

*Vol. VII. page 421.*—"What, then, occasioned this most calamitous catastrophe? We venture to reply, that a moral error, or rather a crime, converted Napoleon's wisdom into folly."

The author has not the merit of novelty in this outrage; and what is more painful, French writers have been guilty of repeating so ridiculous an accusation. What! he who threw himself upon his gigantic adversary at the head of an innumerable army, and conducted it six hundred leagues from his country; who defeated all the armies of his enemy, burned his capital, or was the cause of its destruction, as Walter Scott himself expresses it—had such a man lost his senses? Is it not rather he or those who imagined a calumny which is so fully contradicted by an activity, energy, and genius, of which Napoleon never gave greater proofs?

Let me be allowed here to repeat what I have already remarked. The expedition to Russia, according to common rules, was ill-judged and rash,

and the more so when undertaken without the basis of Poland; and when we consider the formation of the grand army, composed of so many different nations; when we again remember that Napoleon, almost alone, persisted in the project which he conceived and executed in spite of all obstacles and all the opposition and discouragement of the greater number of his most valiant officers, we are astonished how he succeeded in invading a great portion of the vast territory of Russia, and penetrating as far as the capital of that empire. In spite of critics, whatever his enemies may assert, had it not been for the extraordinary havoc of the winter, the grand army would have returned to the frontiers of Poland, have cantoned and established itself on that line, and menaced the Russian empire anew and in a more definitive manner during the following campaign.

*Vol. VIII. pages 429 and 430.*—"But during the length of Napoleon's absence on the Russian expedition, a plot was formed, which served to show how little firm was the hold which the system of the Imperial government had on the feelings of the nation; by what slight means its fall might be effected, and how small an interest a new revolution would have excited," &c.

I shall make two observations on this article:

1st.—I am persuaded that this conspiracy was the work of the Jacobin faction, who always laid in wait to profit by every favourable occasion. This opinion is confirmed by many of the avowals which escaped Fouché in his *Memoirs*.

2d.—The fallacy of the sentiments attributed by the English author to the nation, with respect to Napoleon, is proved by the slight success of this conspiracy when he was not only absent but, as well as his armies, at so considerable a distance from France; it is also proved by his return from the island of Elba, in the month of March, 1815. I think that all those who would after this deny the attachment of the nation to the Emperor, would also deny the light of day.

Vol. VII. page 439.—The author here repeats the false assertions of the libellers upon the personal ill-treatment the Pope experienced from the Emperor Napoleon; and I can confirm their fallacy.

I knew Pope Pius the Seventh from the time of his journey to Paris in 1804, and from that period until his death I have never ceased to receive from the venerable Pontiff marks, not of benevolence only, but even of confidence and affection.

Since the year 1814 I have inhabited Rome; I have often had occasion to see him, and I can affirm that in the greatest number of my interviews with his Holiness, he has assured me that he was treated by the Emperor Napoleon, in every personal respect, as he could have wished. These are his words—

*“Personalmente non ho avuto di che dolermi; non ho mai mancato di nulla; la mia persona fu sempre rispettata e trattata in modo da non potermi lagnare.”*

*"I have had nothing to complain of personally; I wanted for nothing; my person was always respected, and treated in a way to afford me no ground of complaint."*

*Vol. VII. page 493.*—"Alas!" said Augereau to Fouché, "how little do the two actions of which they make so much at Paris resemble our victories in Italy, when I taught Buonaparte the art of war, which he now abuses," &c.

If the desire to sully the fame of Napoleon was not visible from the commencement of this work, we should here have evident proof of it. Calumny is, without doubt, as adroit in its attack as it is efficacious, for it always leaves something in its passage. If Augereau did utter such nonsense, he would have bestowed upon himself the double charge of folly and absurdity. Augereau did not know Napoleon until the latter had become a general-in-chief; and certainly Napoleon has sufficiently proved, that he had completed his course of military study before he commenced his campaigns in Italy.

The battles of Lutzen and of Bautzen are at least as memorable in the eyes of soldiers as the first battles in Italy, perhaps more so, when we remember the French army was composed of conscripts, marines, deficient in cavalry, and when we call to mind the valour Napoleon displayed there. He supplied every thing by the force of his genius and enthusiasm.

*Vol. VII. page 501.*—"But it unfortunately happened that Buonaparte, generally tenacious of his own opinion, and particularly when his reputation was concerned, imagined to himself that he could not cut away the mast without striking the colours which were nailed to it," &c.

The author must allow that the end has too clearly shown how well this opinion of Napoleon was founded. I confess having at this period urged a peace, at whatever price it might be obtained, and having used every effort, however feeble, to influence Napoleon; but I also confess I then believed peace really was desired, whilst subsequent events have proved that the destruction of Napoleon and the abasement of France was in view; and it was granted to the former to persist in his own opinion, as soon as he was convinced of the real intentions of his enemies. These have however unintentionally added to the fame of Napoleon, by persevering in tearing him from France. They have thus shown themselves convinced that the preservation of the one was incompatible with the abasement of the other.

## VOLUME VIII.

*Vol. VIII. pages 21 and 22.*—"A great part of the population of France without having any distinct views as to its future government, were discontented with that of Buonaparte."

The author here gives us a just idea of his love of truth, and of the importance he considers his readers, whom the return from the island of Elba will sufficiently convince of the absurdity of such an assertion.

*Vol. VIII. page 79.*—"Augereau was compelled to abandon the country of Gex and Franche Comté and again to return under the walls of Lyons. Napoleon was not more complaisant to his old comrade and tutor," &c.

The care the author takes to repeat this folly is a new proof of the calumnious and defamatory intention of his book. It would be curious if the author were, in a new edition, to make known the motive for such an opinion. Augereau was certainly a good general; but he perfected himself in the school of Napoleon, and he was inferior to Massena, to Desaix, to Kleber, and to Soult.

*Vol. VIII. page 134, &c.*—All that the author here relates on the occasion of the march of the allies to Paris, is but little worthy of history; setting aside the similes and pleasantries with which he adorns his subject: his exaggeration and his trivial similes

may be very well placed in the tavern scenes of a romance, but they appear to ~~me~~ to be greatly misplaced in history.

I shall indulge myself by subscribing entirely against the principles and the lessons of tactics which he gives even to Napoleon himself. The manœuvres of the latter in the campaigns of France were perhaps amongst his greatest, or at least the most learned of his actions, even according to the declaration of his enemies. If his last manœuvre failed, it was because Paris was not in a condition to resist, and Napoleon did not judge it right to arm its numerous population. He did not even distribute the arms which were in the arsenal of Vincennes; thirty thousand muskets were found when no longer necessary. But if his last manœuvre had succeeded, it is undeniable that the allies arriving at Paris, and having to fight the army, that this capital could and ought to have contained, having Napoleon and the grand army behind them, flanked by the warlike population they had passed through, the allies I repeat would have been entirely lost—they would have been all killed or taken.

Sir Walter Scott says as follows:—

*Vol. VIII. pages 126 and 127.*—"The tactics of Austria being rigidly those of the old school of war, they esteemed their army turned wherever a French division occupied such a post as interposed between them and their allies. This indeed is in one sense true; but it is equally true, that every division so interposed is itself liable to be turned, if the hostile division so interposed take combined measures for attacking it. The catch-

ing, therefore too prompt an alarm or considering the consequences of such a movement as irretrievable, belongs to the pedantry of war, and not to its science."

And here I may be permitted to tell the author, with too much presumption perhaps, but with every possible foundation, that his opinion in this respect may very justly be called pedantry, but it is not and never was conformable to the science of war.—Austrian tactics, like all ancient and modern tactics, have with reason always considered that an army, when turned, is in great danger; but an army is not called turned when a division of the enemy threatens the flank by placing itself in the middle of its adversaries' troops; in this case the attacking division would be endangered, and not the army opposed to it. I will venture to say that when it is really turned, the alarm cannot be too promptly taken, and that the success of such a manœuvre can only be prevented by the greatest vigilance, and by an immediate perception of the enemy's intention.

It appears that Sir Walter Scott's military school would give lessons in tactics to the two belligerent parties.

*Vol. VIII. page 178.*—"Most of these banditti (it is the people of Paris of whom the author thus speaks) were under the influence of Buonaparte's police, and were stimulated by the various arts which his emissaries employed," &c.

We have seen, on the contrary, that he would not distribute arms in the Faubourgs, and it was perhaps

to this that was owing the entry of the allies into Paris, with all its consequences!!!

Vol. VIII. p. 212, &c.—The author here gives himself a great deal of trouble to establish the right of the Senate, to declare the forfeiture of the throne, and his opinion is worthy of the rest of his book. What! a protecting Senate,\* instituted by the constitution of the empire to preserve and guard it, can they destroy it! A body, all the members of which had been named by the Emperor, and who, up to the previous evening, had taken an oath of fidelity to him, had such a body the right not only to break their faith, but also to overthrow the Emperor and his throne! Those, who prodigal of their complaisance and flattery, had never once raised a voice to make the slightest observation upon the imperial government!

These assertions are so false and so absurd that they do not deserve to be refuted seriously.

*Vol. VIII. page 212.*—"Now every legal obligation may be unloosed in the same way in which it is formed."

To this I agree; but was it the Emperor who had received the throne by a *senatus-consultum* of the Senate which was constituted at the same time with himself? Where and how were the votes declared for the abdication, as they had been for the erection of the empire?

\* Un Senat conservateur.

We must excuse the similes and trivial invectives of the author. It is difficult to reconcile the spirit of this voluminous libel with the phrases which escape the author, as it were in spite of himself, such, for instance, as the following :

*Vol. VIII. pages 208, and 209.*—"This feeling, however, would be greatly overbalanced by recollecting the use which was made of the power thus acquired; the subjugation, to wit, of foreign enemies, the extinction of civil dissensions, the protection of property, and, for a time, a personal liberty also. Napoleon's having elevated France from the condition of a divided and depressed country, in the immediate apprehension of invasion, into that of arbitress of Europe, would at once justify committing the chief authority to such able hands, and excuse the means he had used for attaining it; especially in times when the violent and successive changes under which they had long suffered had made the nation insensible to irregularities like those attached to the revolution of the 18th Brumaire. Buonaparte was standing under the canopy, ~~he~~ grasped the regal sceptre in his hand; his assuming the royal seat passed almost as a matter of course.

"Our supposed Parisian has next to review a course of years of such brilliancy as to baffle criticism, and charm reason to silence, till the undertakings of the Emperor seem to rise above each other in wonder, each being a step towards the completion of that stupendous pyramid, of which the gradations were to be formed by conquered provinces," &c.

The style of the author here shows him as an historian, and he does homage to truth as well as to him whose reputation he has so violently attacked throughout the rest of the book.

*Vol. VIII. page 210.*—"The victories of France had brought on her the hatred of Europe, and well nigh national bankruptcy," &c.

I think every impartial reader, and chiefly posterity, will take note of the truth contained in the preceding quotation, and at the same time they will be astonished at the singular reproach, "*that the victories of France almost caused a national bankruptcy;*" for Napoleon left, ~~on~~ his abdication, the treasury filled with gold and silver, and it is known what enormous sums were paid by the public treasury.

*Vol. VIII. page 235.*—"No, no, cried Napoleon, I will have nothing to do with Corsica," &c.

From the way in which this is related, it would be thought that Napoleon despised his native country; but I must assume to myself a more natural interpretation, and one more conformable to the character of Napoleon, which is, that after his abdication he had no desire to remain in the French territories.

*Vol. VIII. page 242.*—"Napoleon carried to Elba the unexpressed execrations of many of his former subjects, who refused to regard his present humiliation as an amends for what he had made them suffer during his power," &c.

The author here sports with his readers, or he has lost his memory; for he appears to have forgotten the triumphant return of Napoleon from the isle of Elba, some months after, without firing a shot. This return, which may almost be called miraculous, sufficiently demonstrates the falsehood and the weakness of the above quotation.

After the allies had entered Paris on the 30th of March, 1814, this exclamation of despair was heard

throughout the rest of France :—*It is treason that has destroyed our Emperor!* The allied troops also heard these complaints and regrets, and these appear to be sufficiently conclusive against the assertion of the author.

*Vol. VIII. page 309.*—“The state of the clergy is next to be considered in 1814,” &c.

How can the author justify what he here says, when he has been previously obliged to avow, “*that all the influence of his power, and all the ascendancy of his genius, were necessary to Napoleon, on proclaiming the treaty he had concluded with the Holy See.*” Has he forgotten that he himself had previously related the disinclination of the people to the re-establishment of religion, so clearly proved by the report of General Delmas, a general the most distinguished by his valour and good fortune? The clergy, on the contrary, owed much to Napoleon, and he knew it, whatever Sir Walter Scott may say. Napoleon, no doubt, feared their entrenching upon his power, but on this essential point, as on all the principal objects of the government, Napoleon was what he ought to have been, the conciliator of the past and the present, and the guarantee for the future; if I may be allowed this expression: he ought, consequently, to have re-established religious worship, but not the abuses which elsewhere had so great an influence in the reformation, and in France contributed to the revolution. It is surprising that a Protestant should thus reproach him, if this protestant was honest in his writings, but he takes care to prove the contrary at every page.

How dare he assert, that he who re-established the clergy, assigned revenues to the bishops and other pastors, and advantaged them in all ways, and at this period against public opinion, had the design of reducing the priesthood by famine? It was a singular means of starving people to recall them from exile, and provide them with places and good payment!!!

*Vol. VIII. page 320.*—"It would be wasting time to show reasons why the French army should have been attached to Napoleon. They could not be supposed to forget the long career of success which they had pursued under his banner, the pensions granted in foreign countries which were now retrenched, and the licensed plunder of their Emperor's unceasing campaigns.

Here let me be allowed to relate to the author the speech of the French grenadier, who fighting with heroic valour under the walls of Paris, was addressed by his enemies, who exclaimed to him—*"How can you show so much courage and devotion for your Emperor, who does not even give you your pay, and owes you such large arrears?"* *"Eh! what does it signify to you (replied the brave fellow,) if I choose to give him credit?"*

Nevertheless the author soon contradicts what he has advanced, because truth compels him to confess it. We read further on:

*Vol. VIII. page 320.*—"Nor was it only the selfish interests of the army which rendered them discontented. The sense of honour, as it was called, or rather the vanity of military ascen-

dancy and national aggrandizement, had been inspired by Buonaparte into all classes of his subjects, though they were chiefly cherished by his companions in arms. According to their opinion, the glory of France had risen with Buonaparte, and sunk with him for ever.

"The meanest follower of the camp affected to feel his share in the national disgrace," &c.

A people, an army of which the meanest follower of the camp shows such sentiments, then, is not a mercenary and pillaging army! The contradictions contained in this book are too numerous and too manifest to be all detected.

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### CHAPTER 13.

Vol. VIII. page 348, &c.—The author, in this chapter, details the causes of the return from the island of Elba.

I do not know whether the persons to whom he attributes it really took part in it. It is incontestable, that its principal cause was the attachment of nearly the whole nation to Napoleon. Those who can deny this, after the manner in which the return from the isle of Elba took place, may also deny the light of the sun. I have already declared, and I boldly repeat, that Napoleon was the man of the nation and of the army: in France the one is not, and cannot be divided from the other; for the army being formed by conscription, was as it were composed of the purest blood of the nation.

One of the great errors of foreigners and also of emigrants is the refusing to acknowledge that the nation was no longer what it was formerly described to be. Its frivolity, its imagined inconstancy, which only belonged to a certain class, were lost in the great affairs and commotions of the last thirty years; and every impartial spectator must allow that the present generation is more enlightened, more solid, and more persevering. Treason and the coalition of nearly all Europe had humbled France, but not conquered her: wounded in her honour she turned towards her new government, introduced and installed by foreign armies, like a young man who has received a cruel insult, impossible or at least extremely difficult to pardon, and only possible after a long series of friendly services and benefit.

If we wish for further proof of the manifest and almost universal contradiction prevailing throughout this book, it will be found in the following passage:

*Vol. VIII. page 393.* "Thus, notwithstanding the return of Napoleon was far from being acceptable to the French universally, or even generally, all open opposition to his government ceased, and he was acknowledged as Emperor within about twenty days after he landed on the beach of Cannes with a thousand followers."

Can it be supposed that if the return of Napoleon had not been agreeable to almost the whole of the French nation, he could have disembarked almost alone at Cannes, traversed France in triumph, and

been re-seated on the throne within twenty days after.

*Vol. VIII. page 395.* "The Congress at Vienna happened fortunately not to be dissolved, when the news of Buonaparte's escape from Elba was laid before them by Talleyrand on the 11th March," &c.

It was perhaps an error in Napoleon not to have awaited the dissolution of the congress; but to determine this it is necessary to know whether circumstances allowed him to prolong his stay in the isle of Elba.

*Vol. VIII. page 421.* "It is true that the influence of Fouché, his minister of police, managed by indirect means to get possession of most of the journals," &c.

I think it was a great fault to have trusted a second time to Fouché a situation of such importance, and the result has but too well proved the justice of this opinion.

*Vol. VIII. page 455, &c.*—The author describes the battle of Waterloo. The rest of the volume is employed in a consideration on the causes of the issue of this battle, which he attributes solely to his countrymen and to Lord Wellington.

It is undeniable that, in order to be just, as a failure is attributed to the general-in-chief of an army, so should also be the victory; to judge however by the reports of the two belligerent parties, the Prussians, with Generals Blucher and Bulow, principally contributed towards it.

## VOLUME IX.

In this volume the author treats of the consequences of the battle of Waterloo, the retreat of Napoleon in the English ships, his removal to Saint Helena, of his residence in this island, and of his death.

I may be excused if I do not, in imitation of the English author, enlarge upon this sad subject. I have not the courage to dwell upon the ninth and last volume of the work of Walter Scott, upon the insults and ironical justifications of the measures of which Napoleon was the victim; modesty, in default of every humane sentiment, should have prevented the dwelling with complacency on the suffering of six years of agony, supported with as much greatness as resignation by an enemy, who, I repeat, was the dupe of his too great confidence—of his too great reliance.

## CONCLUSION.

The work of Sir Walter Scott is evidently an attack upon the glory of France and upon Napoleon. This vast libel must naturally have found, and has found readers, on account of the name of

its celebrated author. By the aid of his name, and a sort of half praise, he endeavours to pass as true all that could injure the memory of Napoleon. It not only contains inaccuracies, falsehoods, and cruel irony, but even calumnies the more revolting, as they concern an enemy who has been dead seven years, who could inspire neither fear nor hatred in a generous mind.

We are astonished to find in this book the substance of nearly all the libels, pamphlets, criticism, and satires, published in profusion during the last thirty years upon France and upon Napoleon.

However this may be, Napoleon was the greatest man that ever existed. Let any impartial reader follow me for a moment through a short review of his life, and he will readily acknowledge this to be true.

Napoleon was born under French laws and on the French territory; reared up in its bosom, he became acquainted with foreign countries and beautiful Italy, whence his family derived their origin, only when at the head of the immortal legions of France. His family inhabited a small town, it was in easy circumstances, without possessing great riches; but in the 13th century his ancestors were distinguished in Tuscany and in the Trevisian Marches, and even enjoyed sovereign privilege in Treviso.

I am far from attaching any material importance to the chance of birth, I merely repeat a fact, because the libellers have been pleased to spread false reports concerning ours. As to all else it appears to me that nobility may be compared to the impression of money, which is real if the metal it covers has an intrinsic value, but which is nothing and worthless if the metal be false and valueless.

He was not the eldest of his family, but occupied that rank, and filled the office of chief of his house from the earliest age.

In the military schools of Brienne and Paris he distinguished himself, and enjoyed an extraordinary consideration for his age both from the professors and from his companions.

It was necessary to submit to two examinations in order to receive the rank of an officer of artillery, and to pass from the military schools into a regiment; he alone went through them both at one time, and was received without opposition in the most brilliant manner at seventeen years of age, either into the regiment of La Fère or that of Grenoble, in which he served before the revolution; he there enjoyed a reputation considerably above his years.

I shall not stop at the contemptible assertion that Napoleon ran the risk of being thrown into the river by his comrades; on the contrary, it was they

who saved him one day when the cramp having attacked him in swimming, he was in great danger of perishing.

As I was myself intended to enter the corps of artillery, I went through the necessary studies, and it was for this purpose that I accompanied my brother to Auxonne, where his regiment (that of La Fere) was garrisoned. I recollect, as well as my extreme youth would permit me, that my brother accomplished the solution of a problem proposed to all the officers of artillery, after having been shut up in his apartment for seventy-two hours in order to complete his purpose.

At the period of the revolution, and when every thing announced approaching war, he was at Valence, in the regiment of Grenoble, into which he had been promoted. At this time all the officers who had not emigrated had permission to return home, in order to prepare for the campaign. We returned to Corsica, where he was soon after appointed to one of the newly-levied battalions.

A law, which appears to have been made for him, allowed the fresh-levied troops to select chiefs from amongst officers of the line, and allowed the latter the liberty of afterwards returning to their old regiments, keeping the rank they had received in the year.

This law was intended to induce officers at that

time to enter the battalions as volunteers, in order that the latter might be promptly organized and instructed.

It had, however, a particular application to Napoleon, who belonged to the privileged corps of artillery, in which promotion, being entirely dependent on seniority, was very slow, he could not therefore have attained for many years the rank of a superior officer; but having been named a chief of battalion in the newly-raised troops, he returned soon after to his regiment of Grenoble, as a superior officer, being scarcely twenty-four years of age. He then made a part of the expedition to Sardinia, commanded by Admiral Truguet and old General Casabianca, and commanded a corps commissioned to attack the islands of Magdalena. His attack succeeded, and he returned to Corsica in consequence of the failure of the principal attack. It was then that old General Paoli, commandant of Corsica, delivered up the island to the English, and that Napoleon, faithful to his duty and not to be persuaded to betray his country, rejoined his regiment in the army of Italy, the head quarters of which were at Nice, and retained his rank of lieutenant-colonel.

A short time after, on his return from his commission of inspecting the different arsenals, he visited his family at Marseilles, where they then resided, and with whom I then was. He was retained, and to use the expression of the times, put in requisition to command the artillery at the neigh-

bouring siege of Toulon, although he was only a lieutenant-colonel, in order to replace General Dom-martin, who had just been severely wounded.

I am astonished how Sir Walter Scott should not only venture to criticise Napoleon, but that he should even go so far as to give him lessons in tactics. As these instructions were not published in the time of Napoleon, it is not surprising that the latter did not profit by them. The author cannot conscientiously reproach him for it; nevertheless he must allow that he whose actions he sometimes denominates *extravagancies* and sometimes *the effects of the rarest talent*, had something more than this in him! Let him observe Napoleon at the age of twenty-four, before a sea-port town occupied by a strong combined army, and defended by a numerous fleet, at the head of a few troops, in part newly-levied, driving away the enemy's ships, and seizing upon the place, with a weak artillery, not by opening the trenches, and observing the long rules of circumvallation, entrenchments, &c. which were not applicable to the situation, by a superior and perfectly novel act. His eagle-eye marked out the spot, the possession of which would enable him to disperse the fleet and render the place untenable.

Arrived at the army of Italy as commandant of artillery, he gave council to the aged and valetudinarian general-in-chief du Merbion, and directed the movements of the troops: the impregnable position of Saorgio was stormed; Oneille, Garesio,

Ormea occupied, the battle of Cairo won, and the route into Italy laid open. But the general-in-chief and the representatives who had all the power, were alarmed at the plan of the campaign he presented to them, and the success of the army stopped there.

A short time after being at Paris, and summoned to the assistance of government, which was threatened by the greater part of the population of Paris, he commanded in chief, although nominally only second in command, repulsed every attack and appeased the sedition.

Being soon raised after to the principal command of the army in Italy, he put into execution the plan he had given to du Merbion; he conquered in the very places he had previously pointed out, divided the Piedmontese and Austrian armies, detached Piedmont from the coalition formed against France, invaded Italy, which he progressively conquered, advanced into Germany, and succeeded in forcing the Emperor of Austria, whose capital he threatened, into a peace.

Commissioned after the peace with the command of the French army in the East, he crossed the Mediterranean at the head of a squadron and of a considerable armament, in defiance of the English fleet; he seized on the island of Malta, reputed impregnable, almost under the eyes of Nelson and in spite of the English fleet.

He departed from Malta, crossed the rest of the Mediterranean, landed in Egypt, and seized on Alexandria by open force.

A few weeks after he gained several pitched battles, destroyed the Mamelukes, and conquered the whole of Egypt.

When far from his sight, his fleet was destroyed near Alexandria, which the Ottomans and the English prepared to attack on all sides, he crossed the desert, and possessed himself of the whole of Syria, except St. John d'Acre. There he experienced his first reverse; but far from being cast down, he returned into Egypt to defend his conquest against a powerful Mussulman army, which he defeated at Aboukir.

A mere general of the Directory or Government of France, he was informed of its distresses and ventured to return to its succour. He once again crossed the Mediterranean in despite of Nelson and the English fleet, and disembarked at Frejus. He was received and led in triumph to Paris, where he was placed with two colleagues at the head of the government.

France had lost Italy; the suppressed factions were awakened; the finances in distress, the treasury empty, credit lost, the territory menaced on all sides—and in a few weeks the treasury was replen-

ished, credit restored, the nation re-assured, and the armies recruited and strengthened.

In the mean time the Austrians had advanced upon the Var, and threatened Provence. Genoa in the occupation of the French, and defended by the intrepid Massena, the conqueror of Zurich, was pressed by the victorious armies of the enemy, who had become masters of the whole of Italy, and of the numerous strong places of this beautiful territory.

The Italians, whom the French had formerly summoned to independence by the voice of Napoleon, turned towards them with hopeless regret; could they a second time perform ~~what~~ they had achieved in 1796, except through a series of extraordinary success?

The allies were on the frontiers of France; the whole of Italy in the power of the coalition, their strong places, their armies, twice as numerous as those of France, deprived the Italians of all hope. If even the French could have regained their superiority, could they have ventured to hope that they should again conquer Italy and renew the same prodigies?

Nevertheless, Napoleon set out on his campaign, and by a conception which surpassed that of Hannibal and Cæsar, he passed the Alps in the rear of the enemy, and whilst the latter advanced upon

Provence. Napoleon, whose progress the Alps, defended by nature and impregnable fortresses, could not arrest, occupied the vast plains of Piedmont, obliged the enemy to retrace his steps, and in the plains of Marengo, in a single day, notwithstanding the fall of Genoa, which Massena had defended against every thing but absolute famine, he gained the brilliant victory of Marengo over Melas, forced him to capitulate, and in one day conquered all the strong places of Piedmont, one of which alone might have occupied his army during a whole campaign.

At a later period when a new coalition was formed, he passed the Rhine, possessed himself of Germany and Vienna, the capital of Austria, and concluded a peace after having defeated the united armies of Prussia and Austria at Austerlitz.

The following year, when threatened by the powerful and warlike monarchy of Prussia, he marched, and in a single day at Jena, he destroyed the armies of Frederick, and took possession of the monarchy and the capital.

Two years after, another coalition was again formed, and though he was in the midst of Spain with his veteran legions, he accepted the defiance of Austria, and flew in person with prodigious celerity from Burgos to Ratisbon, and at the head of a body of troops, principally composed of Bavarians, he defeated the Austrian armies, and advanced upon

Vienna, which he occupied for a second time, and threatened for the fourth.

He dared to conceive the prodigious Russian campaign, and formed a combined army with astonishing rapidity, for the attack of this great empire, unaided by Poland, that is to say, without the independence of that country, and despite of every obstacle, arrived at the ancient capital of the Northern empire.

When alike deceived by the policy of the enemy, by flattery, and perhaps by perfidious suggestions, he ventured to remain on the ruins of the burning city of Moscow. What energy, what perseverance, what activity, what vigilance, in short, what genius did it not require to resist in this position all that simultaneously attacked him?

I repeat, that not a single man ought to have escaped this frightful catastrophe, and whatever may be said against Napoleon, he cannot be denied the merit of having preserved every link in the chain of command, and of having saved the feeble remains of the grand army who escaped either in the march to Smolensko or the astonishing passage of the Beresina.

Instead of his detractors accusing him of undergoing any alteration in his moral faculties, they ought rather to be astonished at their vigour, since they sufficed to save him from so extraordinary a situation.

In fact, every individual member of the grand army, defeated by the elements, by unheard of fatigues, by bodily suffering, by innumerable enemies, in short, by misfortunes great as the imagination can reach, ought to have been morally overwhelmed by so many fatalities.

What was not due then to him upon whom all depended, to whom all addressed themselves, intrusted with the command, with the general direction, and who was obliged to think for all, and to provide in the best manner against every evil, who had only the physical faculties of others, and experienced the same wants and the same sufferings? I do not think history, in its greatest military details, possesses any thing comparable to the Russian campaign, nor any thing which can equal the sublimity, for the right expression fails me, with which the French army rose from the catastrophe in the plains of Bautzen and Lutzen.

Imagine an army formed in haste of youths, from the age of eighteen to twenty, and of men from the depots with a few companies of marines, who had never served in the line; imagine an army, I say, united and formed under the eye of Napoleon, and manœuvring without cavalry, and with heavy besieging artillery, in an open country supplying every thing by the force of enthusiasm, of courage and of genius, arresting the veteran legions of the North and bereaving them of victory.

Next contemplate Napoleon at Dresden, betrayed and surrounded on all sides, boldly encountering every thing, and it will be granted that this spectacle was the greatest ever recorded in the annals of war. At Leipsic, it is true, he was near falling under the double weight of his accumulated enemies, and of the allies who abandoned him, but he passed over their bodies at Hanau, and a second time regained his frontiers, as if by enchantment, and when it would seem he must have perished with the last of his soldiers.

Let us view him during the campaign of France, facing innumerable armies with a handful of brave soldiers, seizing again upon victory the moment she escaped from him, despite of both open and secret treachery.

During his campaigns in Italy he protected the priests and emigrants; he would not destroy the petty princes whom the fate of war placed in some sort at the mercy of the army, and signed with them treaties which cost them, it is true, contributions in money and in works of art, but which assured to them their political existence, at least for a time, and as long as Napoleon could command it.

Subordinate to the Directory, he both resisted the orders of the latter, who desired the destruction of the Holy See and the dictates of false glory, by halting at Tolentino, and as it were at the gates of Rome; he there concluded a peace with the Holy

See, and saved it from the overthrow, which the Directory effected at a later period, when Napoleon no longer commanded in Italy.

When he subscribed the armistice of Leoben, and afterwards of Campo Formio, he outstepped his instructions, and acted as if he had been the governor of France.

He every where showed himself just, severe, economical, an enemy to pillage, and the terror of depredators. In conquered countries he was really a governor, and there first manifested the superior talent and genius which he fully displayed at a later period.

When he attained the Consulate, his colleagues were eclipsed, and he alone governed France.

On his promotion to the Empire it was not France only that he governed, but all the allied countries, and his influence soon extended throughout Europe and even beyond it.

We thus find that he was at an early age an exception to general rules. One may affirm, without exaggeration, that he was born with the instinct for command and superiority. The character of Napoleon announced itself from his infancy, and never belied itself; he was eminently French: perhaps he pushed this affection to extremes.

He undoubtedly loved glory passionately. We may address to him the reproaches which Alexander, Charlemagne, and so many other heroes, have deserved infinitely more. He has moreover explained himself on this head in the most precise manner, and no one but himself would so reply and justify himself; but it will be averred by those who knew him personally, as well as by those who will judge his memory impartially, that no one amongst those upon whom depended the fate of nations, was less vindictive and less cruel.

He was sober, and possessed only the nobler passions. It is vain to dwell upon the horrors with which it has been attempted to taint his manners; since the accusations rest solely upon the reports and the sarcasms of libels, they may well be the appendage of such ephemeral writings, but they do not belong to the province of History.

It is undeniable, that as the husband of a first wife much older than himself, he lived with her as a husband in the greatest harmony until the last day of their union, without giving her any cause of complaint.

It is also undeniable that he cannot be reproached with any titled mistress, nor any scandal, and that married a second time, at forty-two years of age, he displayed towards his second wife a courtesy, an amiability, a gracefulness, and an attention which never failed.

We must, in answer to an accusation of Walter Scott, respecting the egotism of Napoleon, here relate what passed before the birth of his son, when the celebrated Dubois reported to him that the alarming circumstances of the accouchement endangered both the mother and child, and that he must submit to the loss of either one or the other. He replied—*above all things save the mother.* Is not such conduct a sufficiently formal contradiction given the author before hand?

His field sports were neither injurious nor burdensome to the public. Even the luxury of his court had for its object the advancement of arts and manufactures, while its simplicity was extreme.

His administration was admirable; it bore the stamp of genius, and deserves as much study as his campaigns; and his enemies must allow that they were despite themselves his pupils.

From him may be dated the increased activity and vigilance of governments; and since his time, utility and improvement have become their principal objects; and his enemies will vainly deny that they are compelled to follow in the track which he has laid down.

It cannot be forgotten that he was the promoter of the general and uniform codes which govern France. What difficulties had he not to encounter and overcome, in wounded self-love and private in-

terests? With what perseverance did he not attain to this noble and generous end? His genius is displayed in all his actions, and chiefly in those immortal assemblies in which the most distinguished men of France were met together to discuss its code of laws. He mingled in their discussions as if he had been a consummate lawyer. On quitting the cabinet, where he had just combined his plans of campaign, or discussed the difficult affairs of policy and administration, he entered the council of state and put himself on a level with the Portalis and Tronchets. Whatever changes may occur in these immortal codes, it will never be forgotten that he was their author, for if this title justly belongs to princes who have conceived the idea of collecting and classifying the laws, it appertains by a still greater reason to him who took an active part in their composition.

Perfection belongs to God alone; every mortal who approaches towards it is wise, but he who pretends to having attained it, proves himself to be a madman. Where is the hero, the conqueror, who is irreproachable? Titus, who is considered as the best of princes, may he not as I have already remarked, be accused of the death of more than a million Jews? Did he not crucify his unfortunate prisoners in sight of the desolate people of Jerusalem.

War and the cares of government not only demand a firm but an almost insensible heart, and this is the lot of great men. As for me, I scarcely envy

those who are crowned with the *halq* of glory; but while I render full justice to the beauty, the splendor, and the merit of great actions, I confess that fame is only acquired at a price too painful for and incompatible with a sensitive heart.

Let those who accuse Napoleon of having held the reins with too firm a hand, and of having neglected all secondary considerations, in order to advance the general interests of France, think upon the extreme difficulty of the times and of his situation, and chiefly of the almost impossibility of escape from the snares of flattery and the systems of intestine intrigue carried on against the commencement of his power, perhaps even from his campaigns in Italy, and he will be fully justified.

He fell at length beneath long premeditated treason, and vicissitudes of fortune, at a time when the boldest and most skilful of his manœuvres would have produced the most brilliant and decisive victories, if Paris had held out for a few days.

He fell, but armed, and possessing the esteem and even the respect of his enemies, the tears of his warriors and the fond regrets of the great majority of the nation. A few months he was recalled by these wishes and regrets, and almost alone he re-appeared upon the soil of his ancient empire against a powerful king, who was supported by the right of birth and the armies of all Europe. He re-appeared, and in twenty days was re-established on

the throne, carried almost in triumph, and without shedding a single drop of blood.

The coalition was formed anew; he appeared on the field of battle, and victory gave him a passing acknowledgment, but as if she were taking her last farewell.

He sunk at Waterloo, at Paris, and more deeply still at Rochfort, where he took the fatal resolution of placing himself in the hands of his most powerful, but the most ancient and the most infuriated of his enemies.

He perished after six years of agony, confined two thousand leagues from Europe, he whom so many battles had respected!!! He perished, but enmity itself, whilst overwhelming him with its last attacks, contributed to his triumph.

What greater proof could be given of the influence of his genius and of the affection of France, than the precaution of placing between her and Napoleon the immensity of the ocean?

What more conclusive proof can be afforded of the value and merit of such a prisoner than the precautions adopted to guard a single individual? The two thousand leagues of sea did not suffice, a body of troops and a fleet were also necessary. This was not even judged sufficient, and the belligerent powers sent a resident minister, commissioned to


assure himself that Napoleon should not escape them. If Sir Walter Scott and the numerous cohort of periodical writers would for one instant be impartial, they would easily be convinced, that since the world was created there has never appeared a captain, a conqueror, a king, who could be compared with Napoleon.


L. DE SAINT-LEU.

*Florence, May 26th, 1828.*

**THE** References in the text are to the English Edition, but the following Table will enable the reader to refer also to the American Edition, published by Carey, Lea and Carey.

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1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.



